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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis describes the design of an active safety framework that performs trajectory 
planning, threat assessment, and semi-autonomous control of passenger vehicles in 
hazard avoidance scenarios. The vehicle navigation task is formulated as a constrained 
optimal control problem with the constraints bounding a navigable region of the 
environment derived from forward-looking sensors. First, a constrained model predictive 
controller is designed to iteratively plan an optimal or “best-case” vehicle trajectory 
through the constrained corridor. This “best-case” scenario is then used to establish the 
minimum threat posed to the vehicle given its current state and driver inputs. Based on 
this threat assessment, the level of controller intervention required to prevent departure 
from the navigable corridor is calculated and driver/controller inputs are scaled 
accordingly. This approach minimizes controller intervention while ensuring that the 
vehicle does not depart from a navigable corridor. It also provides a unified architecture 
into which various vehicle models, actuation modes, trajectory-planning objectives, 
driver preferences, and levels of autonomy can be seamlessly integrated without changing 
the underlying controller structure.  
 
Simulated and experimental results are presented to demonstrate the framework’s ability 
to incorporate multiple threat metrics and configurable intervention laws while sharing 
control with a human driver. Various maneuvers are tested, including lane-keeping, 
hazard avoidance, and multiple hazard avoidance and show that this framework capable 
of maintaining vehicle stability while semi-autonomously avoiding road hazards and 
conceding significant control to the human driver. 
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1 
1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement and Motivation 
Recent traffic safety reports from the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) show that in 2007 alone, over 41,000 people were killed and 
another 2.5 million injured in motor vehicle accidents in the United States [1]. The 
longstanding presence of passive safety systems in motor vehicles, combined with the 
ever-increasing influence of active systems, has contributed to a decline in these numbers 
from previous years. Still, the need for improved collision avoidance technologies 
remains significant.  
Passenger safety in human-controlled motor vehicles has historically focused on 
passive safety systems. Such systems, which include seat belts, air bags, and crumple 
zones, concentrate primarily on mitigating the effects of collisions on passengers. In 
recent years, the focus of motor vehicle safety has shifted from simply minimizing the 
damage caused by collisions to actively preparing for and avoiding accidents altogether. 
With the advent of anti-lock brakes, yaw stability control, roll stability control, and 
traction control, such active safety systems have begun to play a major role in collision 
mitigation [2].  
While effective at reducing accident frequency, current active safety systems are 
still limited in one respect: their accident avoidance methods are fundamentally 
“reactive” in nature. In each of these systems, intervention is based on current vehicle 
(and possibly road surface) conditions. Because they do not utilize 1) sensory information 
related to the vehicle surroundings or 2) a prediction of the vehicle’s path through its 
surroundings, they are limited in their ability to assess the threat of impending accidents, 
and thus cannot exert corrective actions to avoid them. 
Recent developments in onboard sensing and drive-by-wire technology have 
facilitated the development of active safety systems that consider the vehicle’s 
surroundings and share steering and/or braking control with the driver. These 
“predictive” systems generally attempt to honor driver intentions, opposing them only 
when doing otherwise would lead to a collision or loss of control. This differs from the 
abovementioned reactive systems which seek to match the driver’s desired (steering- 
braking- or acceleration-implied) trajectory by minimizing longitudinal and/or lateral 
wheel slip. For example, anti-lock braking systems react to excessive longitudinal slip 
and a driver’s forceful braking inputs by controlling wheel slip. Similarly, excessive 
longitudinal or lateral wheel slip makes traction- or stability-control systems a sensible 
form of interaction which presumably does not alter the driver’s intended trajectory.  
For predictive safety systems that alter the vehicle trajectory, however, controller 
intervention more significantly affects the driver’s desired vehicle trajectory. In order to 
determine when, how, and how strongly to intervene, predictive systems must first assess 
the threat posed to the vehicle by a given scenario and its associated environmental 
constraints, vehicle states, and driver inputs/performance level. Such systems should 
honor safe driver inputs and maneuvers while intervening when necessary to correct or 
override those deemed unsafe or insufficient given the current (and/or predicted) threat 
scenario. This intervention should strike a necessary balance between the level and 
frequency of intervention: not altering the driver’s steering and braking inputs “too 
much”, “too soon”, or “too often” while still guaranteeing that the vehicle avoid hazards 
independent of that driver input. 
1.2 Background and Literature Review 
In recent years, extensive research has focused on intelligent vehicle navigation. 
Many warning, intervention (i.e. driver-assistance or semi-autonomous control), and 
autonomous control schemes have been developed to perform lateral and longitudinal 
vehicle guidance [2-5]. Supporting technologies such as onboard sensing, lane detection 
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 techniques, and obstacle recognition algorithms have also been proposed and 
implemented in test vehicles [6-9]. 
1.2.1 Autonomous Vehicle Navigation and Control 
As described in [21,23-25], the autonomous vehicle guidance system may be 
broken down into three main tasks: trajectory generation, trajectory re-planning, and low-
level control. The trajectory generation task pre-computes the vehicle trajectory. This 
may be performed online or offline. In ground vehicle applications, the desired trajectory 
may be selected either by driving a vehicle along a desired trajectory and recording GPS 
waypoints to use as a subsequent reference path as in [14-18], or by predefining a 
navigable corridor that circumnavigates road hazards as in [19]. When the former 
planning approach is used, a trajectory re-planner may modify the desired trajectory 
based on current measurements or in response to disturbances. For the latter, however, an 
original vehicle trajectory through the constrained environment must be computed by a 
trajectory re-planner. The task of a trajectory re-planner is thus to compute (or re-
compute) online the desired vehicle trajectory based on current measurements and the 
occurrence of disturbances such as wind gusts, road elevation changes, or obstacles. This 
requires information from onboard sensing to perceive and plan for such occurrences. 
The low-level control system may use any of a multitude of vehicle actuation 
modes (e.g. front and rear wheel steering, differential braking, active suspension, velocity 
control etc.) to track reference commands generated by the trajectory re-planner. While 
the low-level controller is not required to share the same vehicle or environmental model 
as the trajectory re-planner [12,20], recent work in autonomous vehicle control using 
Model Predictive Control (MPC) has shown that using similar models for trajectory re-
planning and low-level control can improve the guidance, navigation, and control 
system’s path-tracking performance [15,21,22].  
In [23], a corridor – as opposed to a specific path – is preselected and a Finite 
Horizon Constrained Optimal Controller (FHCOC) is used perform both the re-planning 
and low-level control tasks required to keep the vehicle within the navigable corridor 
while satisfying input constraints, safety constraints, and ride comfort preferences. This 
approach reduces the path planning task to the simpler task of corridor selection and 
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merges the path re-planning and low level control tasks into the same MPC calculation. 
Furthermore, because the corridor selection in this approach does not plan a specific 
vehicle trajectory, the “re-planning” task performed online by the model predictive 
controller may be more clearly described as an online trajectory “plan” (rather than a “re-
plan”). Having noted the distinction between a pre-computed path/trajectory plan and the 
iterative, online path/trajectory re-plan that is calculated via MPC within a constrained 
corridor, the remainder of this thesis will refer to the MPC trajectory prediction as a 
path/trajectory plan. 
Fully-autonomous vehicle navigation techniques have been developed to track 
pre-defined trajectories [14,24], travel within lane markings [6,23,25,26], or avoid 
obstacles [27] via front wheel steering [15,28,29], rear wheel steering [30], four-wheel-
steering [31], and differential brake steering [3,32]. Control laws employed in these 
systems include PID schemes [12], linear-quadratic regulators [33], non-linear fuzzy 
controllers [34], and finite-horizon constrained optimal controllers [23]. 
1.2.2 Semi-Autonomous Vehicle Navigation and Control 
Among existing proposals for semi-autonomous vehicle navigation, lane-keeping 
systems using audible warnings [27,35], haptic alerts [4,36], steering torque overlays 
[23,37], and various combinations of these have been developed with mixed results [4]. 
In a recent subproject of the European PReVENT consortium, a lane-keeping system was 
designed to prevent lane departure by perceiving the environment, making heuristic-
based trajectory planning decisions based on perceived threat, and implementing warning 
mechanisms or slight steering torque overlay when the vehicle drifts from the desired 
trajectory [38]. 
Many of the semi-autonomous systems developed in previous work address only 
one piece of the active safety problem. While some use planning algorithms such as 
rapidly-exploring random trees [7,39,40], evolutionary programming [41,42] or potential 
fields [43-45] to plan a safe vehicle path, others simply begin with such a path presumed 
[3,16,31]. The threat posed by a particular path is seldom assessed by the controller itself 
and is often only estimated by a simple threat metric based on, for example, the constant 
deceleration required to stop before or constant lateral acceleration required to steer 
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 around a static or dynamic road hazard [46-51]. Finally, hazard avoidance is commonly 
performed using one or more actuation methods (e.g. steering, differential braking, etc.) 
without explicitly accounting for the effect of driver inputs on the vehicle trajectory [38]. 
Such controllers selectively replace (rather than assist) the driver in performing the 
driving task. 
Yu addressed shared control problem in mobility aids for the elderly by designing 
an adaptive shared controller which allocates control authority between the human user 
and a controller in proportion to the user’s performance [52]. Measures of user 
performance in this controller include deviation from a pre-defined trajectory, tip over 
margins, and distance to obstacles. These metrics and the associated intervention are 
designed to act on current and past user performance, however, and do not anticipate 
future deviations, tip over margins, or distances to obstacles. This reactive approach to 
semi-autonomy, while sufficient to control low speed mobility aids, is not well suited for 
high speed applications with significant inertia effects and no pre-planned trajectory. 
1.3 Purpose and Outline of this Thesis 
In this thesis, a framework for passenger vehicle active safety is developed that 
performs vehicle trajectory planning, threat assessment, and hazard avoidance in a 
unified manner. This framework leverages the predictive and constraint-handling 
capabilities of MPC to plan trajectories through a pre-selected corridor, assess the threat 
this path poses to the vehicle, and regulate driver and controller inputs to maintain this 
threat below a given threshold. 
First, an objective function is established to capture desirable performance 
characteristics of a safe or “optimal” vehicle path through a bounded corridor. The 
boundaries of this corridor trace the edges of the navigable road surface and are assumed 
to have been derived from forward-looking sensor data and a higher-level corridor 
planner. A model predictive controller then calculates the “best case” vehicle trajectory 
through this bounded corridor using a model of the vehicle and environmental 
disturbances. This predicted trajectory and its associated control inputs are assumed to 
provide a “best case” or minimum-threat avoidance maneuver given the vehicle’s current 
state. Key stability metrics from this prediction are then used to calculate the intervention 
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required to prevent departure from the safe region of travel and driver/controller inputs 
are scaled accordingly. Figure 1.1 shows a block diagram of this system. 
 
Figure 1.1: Diagram of an active safety system 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the constrained MPC 
problem setup, establishes its utility in trajectory planning, and demonstrates its 
effectiveness in autonomous lane/corridor tracking. Methods for assessing the threat 
implicit to a given maneuver are then presented in Chapter 3, followed by a semi-
autonomous control framework and intervention law in Chapter 4.
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2 
2 CHAPTER 2: PATH PLANNING  
In this proposed semi-autonomous framework, the best case (or baseline) vehicle 
path through a given region of the state space is established by a model predictive 
controller. Metrics from this predicted path will be used to assess the threat presented to 
the vehicle and steering/braking inputs calculated by the controller will be used to track 
the path. This chapter describes the model predictive controller setup and demonstrates – 
via simulation and experiment – its ability to plan optimal trajectories through static and 
time-varying constrained roadway corridors. 
2.1 Problem Statement 
Previous research from as early as 1938 has shown that human drivers tend to 
operate vehicles within a field of safe travel [53] rather than along a specific path. 
Effective semi-autonomous controllers should account for and allow this freedom of 
motion within a navigable corridor to avoid unnecessarily constraining human driver. 
Additionally, a semi-autonomous controller should accurately predict departure from the 
navigable corridor early enough to keep the vehicle from leaving it. In high-threat 
situations, this may require the controller to assume full control of the vehicle in order to 
guide it to safety autonomously (or until control can safely be returned to the driver). 
Model Predictive or “receding horizon” Control (MPC) can be configured to meet 
each of these needs [54-56]. By constraining the vehicle position to remain within the 
navigable corridor, this optimal control method may be designed to assert little or no 
control when the driver keeps the vehicle within that corridor. The predictive nature of 
the algorithm allows it to anticipate and avoid imminent corridor departure by 
considering both current and predicted vehicle states and environmental conditions. 
Finally, a semi-autonomous controller based on the foundation of constrained MPC may 
be configured to appropriate full control authority to the controller in high-threat 
situations with confidence that, acting autonomously, the controller can guide the vehicle 
to safety. Further advantages offered by this control method are discussed in 2.1.3. 
This chapter begins with a description of the MPC problem setup and a definition 
of key terms. The remainder of the chapter then explores the relationship between critical 
controller parameters, including objective function setup, constraint enforcement, and 
prediction/control horizons on MPC-based vehicle navigation within constrained 
corridors. Key metrics of this relationship include corridor-keeping performance (defined 
proximately), vehicle stability, and controller robustness to unmeasured disturbances. The 
MPC controller that emerges from this chapter will serve as the foundation to the semi-
autonomous navigation framework developed in Chapter 3. 
2.1.1 Model Predictive Control 
Model Predictive (or “receding horizon”) Control is a family of finite-horizon 
optimal control schemes that iteratively minimizes a performance objective defined for a 
forward-simulated plant model subject to performance and input constraints [33,57,58]. 
Stated another way, MPC uses a model of the plant to predict future vehicle state 
evolution and optimize a set of inputs such that this prediction satisfies constraints and 
minimizes a user-defined objective function. When it was originally developed in the 
petrochemical process control industry in the late 1970’s, MPC’s intensive computational 
requirements restricted its application to processes with low control update rates. 
Subsequent improvements in the speed of computing hardware and the efficiency of 
optimization algorithms have significantly expanded its range of opportunity to include 
diverse applications ranging from robot manipulators [59,60] to vehicle navigation 
systems [14,15,21,61], inventory management [62], and clinical anesthesia [63]. 
The algorithm sequence is as follows. At each time step, t, the current plant state 
is sampled and a cost-minimizing control sequence spanning from time t to the end of a 
control horizon of n sampling intervals, t+n∆t, is computed subject to inequality 
constraints. The first element in this input sequence is implemented at the current time 
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 and the process is repeated at subsequent time steps. The basic MPC problem setup as 
implemented in the current work is described here. 
For a discrete plant model described by  
kvkukk vBuBAxx ++=+1  (2.1) 
kvkky vDCx +=  (2.2)
with x, y, u, and v representing states, outputs, inputs, and disturbances of the system  
respectively, a quadratic objective function over a prediction horizon of p sampling 
intervals is defined as 
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where Ry, Ru, and R∆u represent diagonal weighting matrices penalizing deviations from 
yi = ri,  and ui = 0, ρε represents the penalty on constraint violations and ε represents the 
maximum constraint violation over the prediction horizon p. Inequality constraints are 
defined as: 
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where the vector ∆u represents the change in input from one sampling instant to the next, 
the superscript “(•)j ” represents the jth component of a vector, k represents the current 
time, and the notation (•)j(k+i|k) denotes the value predicted for time k+i based on the 
information available at time k. The vector V allows for variable constraint softening over 
the prediction horizon, p, when ε is included in the objective function. With n 
representing the number of free control moves, ∆Uk and Uk are calculated by choosing a 
blocking vector Jm such that  
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where z = [z0, …, zn-1]T represents the free optimization variables of the optimization 
problem. By augmenting the vectors y, U, ∆U, and V over the prediction horizon as 
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the weighting matrices Su, Su1, Sx, and Hx can be calculated to express the augmented 
plant outputs over p by 
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The objective function can also be expressed in terms of the augmented outputs, 
inputs, and disturbances by calculating Kx, Ku, Kut, Kv, and K∆u such that 
( ) 211 21 ερε+ΔΔ+Δ+++= −− kkkvkutkukxk uxJ UHUUKVKUKK TTTTT  (2.9)
and expressing the constraints as  
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 ckc bUA ≤Δ . (2.10)
Having thus expressed the control problem as a quadratic program, it can then be 
solved using conventional optimization routines [33,57]. 
2.1.2 Notes on Stability 
Previous work in robust MPC methods has shown that in finite-horizon control 
problems, stability can be guaranteed by forcing predicted behavior to reach steady state 
within a finite number of sampling intervals. This stability condition has inspired the use 
of end-point constraints [64-67], min-max feedback formulations [68], and stabilizing 
feedback loops which replace transfer functions with finite impulse responses while using 
future values of the reference signal (rather than future values of the control inputs) as 
degrees of freedom in the optimization routine [69]. Each of these approaches effectively 
seeks to retain a margin for future feedback action, making it available to the MPC 
optimization only as prediction time passes. This guarantees that the optimization will 
remain feasible even when disturbances and/or model mismatch create discrepancy 
between predicted and true state evolution. 
When applied to transient control problems, stabilizing MPC imposes significant 
restrictions on the target set/cost function combination. In vehicle control problems, 
mission requirements dictate the target set, which is rarely invariant as stabilizing MPC 
requires. In [70], a variable horizon is used in combination with the constraint tightening 
approach in order to enable robust entry into an arbitrary (and not necessarily invariant) 
target set. This approach includes the horizon as a decision variable in the optimization 
and tightens target constraints as a function of this horizon. Further, by determining an 
appropriate objective function cost on time, this approach guarantees finite-time entry 
into the target set despite disturbances. In this work, input and input rates were 
constrained to remain within feasible limits while terminal constraints on vehicle position 
were tightened to ensure a feasible end-state within the navigable corridor. 
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2.1.3 Advantages of Model Predictive Control in Vehicle Navigation 
Model predictive control offers a number of significant advantages that make it 
particularly well-suited to autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicle navigation 
problems. Its ability to explicitly consider environmental, performance and actuator 
constraints enables corridor-based navigation and allows it to operate near the limits 
imposed by those constraints. This environmentally-aware prediction, coupled with an 
objective-function-optimal control law, has been shown to closely mimic the 
performance of a human driver [54]. Its finite prediction horizon fits naturally with and 
may be based on the information provided by finite-horizon, forward-looking sensors. 
Additionally, the model-based nature and multivariable-compatibility of the control 
calculation allows MPC to account for and easily adapt to structural changes and actuator 
availability from one vehicle model and/or loading configuration to the next. This 
adaptability may allow for reduced-cost controller implementation across product 
families and through ever-shifting safety requirements. 
Finally, MPC’s predictive nature allows certain constrained configurations to 
effectively plan their own path within a partitioned environment without requiring any 
pre-defined vehicle trajectories. That is, where other control methods require a specific 
pre-planned path through the environment (which is often planned by a separate and 
suboptimal system), MPC can plan its own (optimal) path given a set of situational 
position constraints. The path thus planned through the (pre-delineated) safe operating 
environment potentially offers a number of advantages over alternative trajectory 
planning methods; not only is it explicitly aware of vehicle dynamics, measured 
disturbances, and actuator limitations, but the constraint-satisfying trajectory plan it 
generates is both feasible (since it is obtained from an already-calculated set of control 
inputs) and optimal (with respect to some performance metric such as minimum lateral 
acceleration over a future time horizon, minimum wheel slip, etc). In the semi-
autonomous framework described below, this optimal prediction can serve not only as a 
best case trajectory plan, but also as an effective threat assessor. The remainder of this 
chapter develops and demonstrates an MPC-based autonomous controller in corridor-
based active hazard avoidance. 
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2.2 Assumptions 
In this thesis it is assumed that the position of road lanes is available with no noise 
or uncertainty and that road hazards have been detected, located, and mapped into a 2-
dimensional navigable corridor. Existing systems and previous work in onboard sensing 
and sensor fusion justify this as a reasonable assumption [8,71]. Radar, LIDAR, and 
vision-based lane-recognition systems [2,7,9], along with various sensor fusion 
approaches [72,73] have been proposed to provide the lane, position, and environmental 
information needed by this framework. 
Additionally, where multiple corridor options exist (such as cases where the 
roadway branches or the vehicle must navigate around an obstacle in the center of the 
lane), it is assumed that a high-level path planner has selected a single corridor through 
which the vehicle should travel. 
2.3 Simulation Studies 
Simulations were conducted to explore the effect of various MPC configurations 
on its utility and suitability as a path planner. Setup and results from these simulations are 
discussed below. 
2.3.1 Simulation Setup 
Autonomous control maneuvers were simulated using two different vehicle plant 
models. The first plant (“Plant A”) was represented by a nonlinear ADAMS® model* of a 
generic truck featuring a double wishbone suspension, passive roll stabilizers, and rack 
and pinion steering. Tire forces were approximated via a Pacejka tire model. An 
isometric view of this model is shown in Figure 2.1 and its parameters are defined in 
Appendix A. 
                                                 
* Steven Peters wrote and generously lent an ADAMS-Matlab interface to couple this 
model with the Simulink-based controller. 
  
Figure 2.1. ADAMS plant model 
The second vehicle plant model (“Plant B”) is similar to the one presented in [17]. 
This model describes longitudinal and lateral tire forces with the semi-empirical Pacejka 
tire model, where the longitudinal and cornering forces are assumed to depend on the 
normal force, tire slip angle, surface friction, and longitudinal slip. 
I) Vehicle Model 
Two different vehicle models were used in this study’s control calculations. The 
first (“Model A”) accounts for the kinematics of a 4-wheeled vehicle, along with its 
lateral, yaw, and roll dynamics. This controller model was used for simulations 
conducted with Plant A (for which roll dynamics are appreciable).  
The second model (“Model B”) does not consider suspension compliance, making 
it better suited for passenger vehicles with low centers of gravity and little appreciable 
roll dynamics. This more computationally efficient model was used to control Plant B in 
simulation and the test vehicle in experiment. Vehicle states for Model A include the 
position of its center of gravity [x, y], the vehicle yaw angle ψ, yaw rate , sideslip angle 
β, roll angle φ, and roll rate ϕ&  as illustrated in Figure 2.2 (a and b). Model B is described 
by the same set of states less the roll angle φ, and roll rate ϕ& . This model is illustrated by 
Figure 2.2 (a) alone. 
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 (a) 
  
(b) 
Figure 2.2: Vehicle roll (a and b) and slip (a only) models used in MPC controller 
Tire compliance is included in the model by approximating lateral tire force (Fy) 
as the product of each tire’s cornering stiffness (C) and sideslip angle (α) as shown in 
(2.11) and illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
  (2.11)
 
Figure 2.3: Linearized tire compliance model used in equations of motion 
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Table 2.1 defines and quantifies each model’s parameters. These parameters were 
chosen to best match the vehicle plant being tested: roll model parameters were chosen to 
emulate those of the ADAMS plant while the slip model parameters were matched to the 
low-roll-center simulation model and experimental plant. 
Table 2.1: Vehicle model parameters 
Value 
Symbol Description [units] 
Roll Model Slip Model 
m Total vehicle mass  [kg] 2450 2050
Izz Yaw moment of inertia  [kg·m2] 3053 3344
xf C.g. distance to front wheels  [m] 1.13 1.43
xr C.g. distance to rear wheels  [m] 1.43 1.47
yw Track width [m] 1.56 1.44
Cf Front cornering stiffness  [N/deg] 1640 1433
Cr Rear cornering stiffness  [N/deg] 1140 1433
μ Surface friction coefficient {0.25, 0.5, 1} 1
ms Chassis sprung mass [kg] 1880 --
Ixx Roll moment of inertia [kg·m2] 834 --
h Sprung c.g. height [m] 0.34 --
kf Front axle roll stiffness [N·m/rad] 30 x 103 --
kr Rear axle roll stiffness [N·m/rad] 30 x 103 --
bf Front axle roll damping [N·m·s/rad] 1600 --
br Rear axle roll damping [N·m·s/rad] 1600 --
Equations of motion for the roll model are 
( )βψ += cosVx&  (2.12)
( )βψ += sinVy&  (2.13)
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ϕϕβψβψβψ sincossin &&&&& hmVVmF xy −++++=∑  (2.14)
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 ∑ = ψ&&zzz IM  (2.15)
∑ = ϕ&&xxx IM  (2.16)
Linearized about a constant speed and assuming small slip angles, these become 
Vx =&  (2.17)
( )βψ +=Vy&  (2.18)
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where Cf and Cr represent the cornering stiffness of the lumped front wheels and the 
lumped rear wheels, 
xx
s
I
hmD
2
1+= , and xf and xr denote the longitudinal distances from 
the c.g. of the front and rear wheels, respectively. 
Equations of motion for the slip model include 
( )βψ += cosVx&  (2.22)
( )βψ += sinVy&  (2.23)
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∑ ++++= βψβψβψ cossin &&& VVmFy  (2.24)
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∑ = ψ&&zzz IM  (2.25)
Similarly linearized about a constant speed and assuming small slip angles, these 
become 
Vx =&  (2.26)
( )βψ +=Vy&  (2.27)
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II) Objective Function and Constraint Handling 
The controller’s projected path along a predefined trajectory or through a 
constraint-imposed corridor is shaped by the performance objectives implicit in the MPC 
cost function. Many options exist for characterizing desirable vehicle trajectories [54]. In 
this chapter, various vehicle states and trajectory characteristics, including vehicle 
sideslip β, yaw rate ψ& , roll angle φ, and lateral acceleration ÿ are penalized in the 
objective function to understand how minimizing each affects the controller’s ability to 1) 
track a predefined reference trajectory and 2) navigate within a constrained corridor. 
For reference trajectory tracking, lateral deviation of the vehicle’s center of 
gravity (yy) from the corridor centerline (ry) is penalized by including Ryy > 0 in an 
objective function of the form 
where 
( )ϕϕϕϕψψψψββ RRRRRRdiag yyy &&&&&&&&=R . (2.31)
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The resulting trajectory-tracking setup through a hazard-containing environment may 
then be illustrated by Figure 2.4. 
 
Figure 2.4: Illustration of a trajectory-tracking control setup 
For corridor-keeping, penalties on deviation from a desired trajectory (Ry) are 
replaced with lateral position constraints. As explained in 2.2, this form of corridor-based 
navigation assumes that the environment has been delineated previously, with the 
boundaries of the navigable road surface at each time step described by the constraint 
vectors 
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In (2.32), yymax and yymin represent the upper and lower limits on the vehicle lateral 
position (y) as illustrated in Figure 2.5. These limits exclude more than simply off-
road/out-of-lane regions from the navigable corridor – they also extend to stationary 
and/or moving hazards in the roadway such as debris, pedestrians or other vehicles.  
Thus, a hazard in the roadway looks to the controller like a constriction in the corridor as 
illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5: Illustration of constraint placement (yymax ,  yymin) for static hazards 
In order for the constraint space to remain feasible,  
yymax – yymin > 0. (2.33) 
Constraints were softened as described in (2.4) by including the magnitude of 
their violation (ε) in the objective function, which takes the form 
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A spatial interpretation of the constrained and unconstrained approaches is 
illustrated in Figure 2.6. 
 
 
 (a) 
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(b) 
Figure 2.6. Spatial interpretation for autonomous vehicle navigation using (a) 
penalties on lateral position deviation from a specific trajectory (Ryy > 0 and ρy = 0) 
vs. (b) penalties on departure from a constrained corridor (Ryy = 0 and ρy > 0) 
In summary, the constrained MPC controller was configured to use vehicle 
position, input magnitude, and input rate constraints to avoid hazards while minimizing 
one of many possible performance measures to maximize vehicle stability. By enforcing 
vehicle position constraints at the boundaries of the navigable region of the road surface 
(i.e. the lane edges on an unobstructed road), the controller forces the MPC-generated 
path to remain within the constraint-bounded corridor whenever dynamically feasible. 
Coupling this lateral position constraint with input constraints, input rate constraints, and 
vehicle dynamic considerations, the corridor delineated by yymax and yymin translates to a 
safe operating “tube” within the state space [19,74]. 
III) Prediction and Control Horizons 
Few studies have investigated the influence of prediction (p) and control horizon 
(n) on MPC performance. Those that have [75,76] studied horizon length have shown 
that, in general, longer prediction horizons lead to more stable controllers, with stability 
in the limiting case (as Hp → ∞) approaching that of infinite horizon linear quadratic 
regulators. In the autonomous simulations presented here, p was varied to assess its effect 
on control performance. In experiments, p was fixed at 35 or 40 samples, with n = p/2. 
Chapter 3 explores how varying prediction and control horizon length affects threat 
assessment and vehicle trajectory in various hazard scenarios. 
IV) Maneuvers through Static Corridors 
Lane keeping, hazard avoidance, and double lane change maneuvers were 
simulated to test this controller’s ability to keep the vehicle within a navigable corridor 
bounding static hazards. Qualitatively, each of these maneuvers requires varying degrees 
of constraint-handling and trajectory optimization. Lane-keeping tests gauge the 
controller’s ability to keep the vehicle – initially headed out of the corridor – inside it. 
Hazard avoidance tests require that the controller keep the vehicle inside a constricting 
corridor by navigating around a roadway obstacle, and double lane change maneuvers 
measure the controller’s ability to handle maneuvers with significant load transfer. 
V) Maneuvers through Time-Varying Corridors 
Moving hazards were factored into the autonomous control problem by estimating 
their future position based on their current position, velocity, and (optionally) 
acceleration. In the simulation results shown below, unnavigable regions representing 
obstacles moving in one dimension (results may be generalized to 2-dimensional motion) 
were factored into the placement of time-varying corridors as follows: 
Given a (constant) host velocity  and obtaining the current velocity of 
roadway hazards  from tracking sensors or vehicle-to-vehicle communication, where 
 and  represent the current position of the host and hazard, respectively at 
time t, the estimated time to collision 
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to first order where ( ) ( ) hosthaz xtxtx &&& −=~ , ( ) ( ) ( )txtxtx hosthaz −=~ , or  
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to second-order (requiring that ( ) 0~ 0 ≤tx  in (2.36)). 
Given 
0tc
tΔ , the x position of each road hazard at tc is then estimated as 
( ) ( ) ( )
00
00 tchazhaztchaz
ttxtxtx Δ⋅+= &  (2.37)
or 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2000
000 2
1
tchaztchazhaztchaz
ttxttxtxtx Δ⋅+Δ⋅+= &&& (2.38)
to first- and second-order, respectively. Hazard depth from the host vehicle’s perspective 
is then estimated by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )0000 ~
0
txtxtxtxtx hazhazhaztchaz
&& Δ⋅−Δ≈Δ . (2.39)
Constraints on vehicle position are drawn at each sampling instant to form a convex (in y) 
corridor from the outline of each hazard’s anticipated position and depth at time tc. Figure 
2.7 illustrates what a snapshot of this time-varying constraint placement might look like 
to the controller. 
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Figure 2.7: Illustration of constraint placement (yymax ,  yymin) for moving hazards 
Notice that the constraint “shadow” cast by a hazard moving in the opposite 
direction as the host vehicle appears shallower than the hazard’s true depth. Similarly, the 
shadow cast by a hazard moving in the same direction as the host vehicle is effectively 
deepened. 
VI) Actuator Configuration 
In previous studies, autonomous path-tracking control has been performed via 
front wheel steering [15,28], rear wheel steering [30], four-wheel-steering [31], 
differential brake (i.e. front and/or rear wheel skid-) steering [3,32], and combinations of 
braking and steering [16,22,77,78]. In [29], an LQ controller used each of these input 
strategies to track a modified step trajectory similar to a single lane change. Comparing 
each strategy, this study found that front wheel steering provided the greatest efficiency 
in terms of the ratio of peak tire force used to total available tire force. Four wheel 
steering showed similar efficiency to front wheel steering, followed by front- and four-
wheel braking input schemes. Due to load transfer experienced during braking 
maneuvers, along with low efficiency in general for differential brake steering, rear wheel 
steering is ill-suited as a standalone actuation method for autonomous hazard avoidance 
applications. 
In the simulations shown below, front wheel steering was used predominantly, 
though to demonstrate this control framework’s applicability to multiple actuator 
configurations, one result is shown that uses a combination of front wheel steer with four 
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 wheel differential braking. Yaw moment actuation is added to the control calculation by 
including ( ) zzz MI1  in equation (2.20) for the roll model and (2.29) for the slip model. 
The moment command Mz may then be distributed across the four wheels using various 
braking allocation schemes. In the simulation shown below, it was distributed evenly 
across all four wheels. 
2.3.2 Simulation Results 
Autonomous MPC-based control was successfully simulated using both static and 
moving hazards. The results below demonstrate the controller’s suitability for both sets of 
conditions. 
I) Static Hazards 
Static hazards such as lane/road edges and stationary obstacles can be avoided by 
planning a specific path around them or by excluding them from a bounded corridor via 
position constraints. The simulation results below note the differences between these two 
approaches, demonstrate the advantages provided by “corridor-keeping” over “trajectory 
tracking”, and illustrate the effect of prediction horizon length on corridor-tracking 
performance. 
a) Trajectory Tracking vs. Corridor-Keeping 
Figure 2.8 shows simulation results for double lane change maneuvers performed 
using a) a reference trajectory with lateral deviation from that trajectory penalized (Ryy > 
0 and ρy = 0) and b) a constrained corridor with Ryy = 0 and lateral position constrained to 
remain within the corridor (ρy > 0). In both simulations, vehicle sideslip β was also 
penalized by setting Rββ > 0. 
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 (a) (b) 
Figure 2.8: Simulation results for a double lane change path-tracking (a) and 
corridor-keeping (b) maneuver 
As Figure 2.8 (a) and (b) illustrate, constraint-based navigation allows the 
controller greater freedom to minimize sideslip and stability/comfort-related performance 
metrics (such as steer angle, yaw rate, roll angle, and lateral acceleration) while still 
ensuring that the vehicle does not leave the navigable roadway. In contrast, trajectory-
following does not consider an available corridor of travel, requiring instead that the 
controller sacrifice other performance metrics to ensure as little deviation from the path 
centerline as possible. 
Figure 2.9 (a) – (c) show the RMS lateral position (y) and sideslip (β) experienced 
by an autonomously-controlled vehicle as it navigates a 1-m wide lane during a double 
lane change maneuver. Figure 2.9 (a) and (b) plot the maximum and root mean square 
(RMS) lateral deviation (y) and vehicle sideslip (β) against the ratio of the objective 
function weights Ryy / RXX, where RXX penalizes one of several possible nonzero vehicle 
states such as sideslip β (RXX = Rββ), yaw rate ψ& ( ψψ &&RRXX = ), roll angle φ (RXX = Rφφ), 
lateral acceleration alat (RXX = Rÿÿ), and lateral load transfer LTF (RXX = RLTF,LTF). Figure 
2.9 (c) shows simulation results for the weighting ratios labeled i), ii), and iii) in (a) and 
(b). 
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Figure 2.9. Tradeoffs between maximum (a) and RMS (b) lateral vehicle position 
(dotted) and other vehicle states (solid) observed for various relative 
weightings Ryy/RXX in a path-tracking scenario. 
As expected, Figure 2.9 shows that as Ryy / RXX increases, the vehicle trajectory 
more closely matches the desired trajectory at the expense of more control effort and 
greater sideslip, lateral acceleration, and related vehicle states. Also note that similar 
results are obtained for various choices of RXX due to dynamic coupling of sideslip, yaw 
rate, roll, lateral acceleration, and load transfer. This result suggests that MPC-based 
trajectory tracking control of ground vehicles may penalize any of these in combination 
with lateral position error with similar results and controller tuning tradeoffs. 
Figure 2.10 shows how these tradeoffs differ in a constrained corridor-keeping 
framework when the penalty on lateral deviation from the centerline (Ryy) is replaced with 
a soft constraint on lateral deviation from the navigable corridor via (2.4). 
 
(a) 
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Figure 2.10. Corridor-keeping performance tradeoffs between maximum (a) and 
RMS (b) vehicle states observed for various position-constraint-to-vehicle state 
penalties (ρy/RXX) 
Comparing Figure 2.10 with Figure 2.9 shows that by constraining lateral vehicle 
position (rather than weighting its deviation from the lane centerline) and penalizing 
stability-critical performance criteria, the vehicle trajectory can be tuned to satisfy 
roadway-imposed constraints while simultaneously reducing vehicle sideslip, lateral 
acceleration, and other stability-critical states. Notice that instead of leveling off at the 
3.25º (max) and 1.5º (RMS) sideslip required by the trajectory-tracking controller, the 
corridor-keeping alternative remains within the navigable roadway while requiring only 
~0.9º (max) and ~0.55º (RMS) sideslip. Figure 2.11 shows a set of corridor-keeping 
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maneuvers performed with different vehicle states penalized and 01.0≈XXy Rρ  
(corresponding to position iii in Figure 2.10). 
 
Figure 2.11. Autonomous corridor-keeping controller with various states X weighted 
in the objective function 
As Figures 2.9—2.11 illustrate, various vehicle states can be penalized in the 
objective function with relatively similar path- or corridor tracking results due to dynamic 
coupling of these states in the vehicle model. Having noted this similarity, front wheel 
sideslip ( ( ) δβψα −+= &Vx f ) was chosen as the trajectory characteristic to minimize in 
the corridor-based MPC framework for the remainder of the tests presented in this thesis. 
This choice was motivated by a number of observations. In addition to offering similar 
performance to that obtained by minimizing other trajectory characteristics in the 
objective function, front wheel sideslip strongly influences the controllability of front-
wheel-steered vehicles since cornering friction begins to decrease above critical slip 
angles. These critical angles are well-known and provide a direct mapping from 
environmental conditions to vehicle handling limitations. The linearized tire compliance 
model’s failure to account for this decrease further motivates the suppression of front 
wheel slip angles to reduce controller-plant model mismatch. In [30] it is shown that 
limiting tire slip angle to avoid this strongly nonlinear (and possibly unstable) region of 
the tire force curve can significantly enhance vehicle stability and performance. Finally, 
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 trajectories that minimize wheel slip also tend to minimize lateral acceleration and yaw 
rates, leading to a safer and more comfortable ride. 
b) Prediction Horizon 
Figure 2.12 illustrates tradeoffs between lateral vehicle position and vehicle 
sideslip for various relative objective function weightings and prediction horizons. Notice 
that for short prediction horizons ( )15=n , small changes in objective function weightings 
leads to large variation in sideslip and lateral vehicle position. Similarly, longer 
prediction horizons (n ≥ 25) lead to more uniform state tradeoffs as they allow the 
controller to anticipate roadway hazards earlier. 
 
Figure 2.12. Response surface illustrating the relationship between lateral vehicle 
position, sideslip, and prediction horizon length (with control horizon = 12) 
Figure 2.13 shows the effect of combining steering and differential braking (i.e. 
four wheel skid steering) in the MPC control calculation to navigate autonomously within 
a constrained corridor. Notice that compared to controlling only steering angles, using 
both actuation modes allows the controller to reduce vehicle sideslip with a brake-
imposed moment while controlling lateral vehicle position via an applied steer angle. 
These differences, along with the larger steer command required in the combined input 
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case to compensate for the yaw-correcting moment applied by the brakes, are apparent in 
a comparison of Figure 2.13 to Figure 2.10(c)iii. 
 
Figure 2.13: Simulation showing the combined effect of steering and braking 
actuation on autonomous corridor-keeping 
II) Moving Hazards  
Figure 2.14 shows the result of autonomous vehicle navigation through a moving 
corridor in which the velocity of hazards 1 and 2 varied as shown in the final subplot. 
Note that in these plots, the host vehicle is located at the leftmost edge of the predicted 
trajectory. The trajectory prediction is color-coded according to the front wheel sideslip 
predicted at each sample, with the step predicting the largest sideslip marked by a circle. 
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 T1 = 1.05 sec 
T2 = 4.25 sec 
T3 = 5.95 sec 
T4 = 6.15 sec 
T5 = 7.80 sec 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Autonomous vehicle navigation through moving hazards using a first-
order estimation of future hazard position  
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At T1, hazard 1 is moving with the same velocity as the host vehicle ( 0~1 =x ) and 
thus poses no threat. By T2, hazard 1 has decelerated to a constant velocity of 10 m/s 
( ), leading to a finite time to collision as given by 10~1 −=x (2.35) and a corresponding 
placement of the lateral position constraint (2.37). At T3, the host vehicle successfully 
clears the corner of hazard 1 and by T4, the prediction has “seen” hazard 2 (which is 
gaining speed in the opposite/negative direction). By T5, the host vehicle successfully 
clears the second hazard and proceeds toward the outside edge of the navigable corridor.  
Note that by using the first-order-hold described by (2.35) and (2.37), the 
predicted collision time and location does not account for the acceleration of each hazard. 
This is corrected to a small degree by updating hazard position and velocity at every 
sampling instant (20 hz). For larger hazard accelerations, the second-order prediction 
described by (2.36) and (2.38) is better suited to forecast future hazard position. 
2.4 Experimental Studies 
2.4.1 Experimental Setup 
Experimental testing was performed using a human-driver-operated test vehicle at 
Ford’s Dearborn Development Center on dry asphault (μ ≈ 1). As current law requires a 
mechanical linkage between the driver and the wheels, an Active Front Steer (AFS) setup 
was used to couple driver and actuator inputs via a planetary gear. For autonomous 
control tests, the driver input was removed from the control problem by asking the driver 
to hold the steering wheel at δdriver = 0. An inertial and GPS navigation system was used 
to measure vehicle position, sideslip, yaw angle, and yaw rate while a 1 GHz dSPACE 
processor ran controller code and interfaced with steering actuators. As in simulations, 
lane data was assumed to have been derived from forward-looking sensors and was 
therefore predefined virtually. 
Table 2.2 shows the controller parameters used in autonomous experiments. 
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Table 2.2: Controller parameters 
Symbol Description Value [units]
p Prediction horizon {35, 40} [steps]
n Control horizon {18, 20} [steps]
ΔtMPC Prediction time step 0.05 [s]
Rαα Weight on front wheel slip 0.2657 [1/rad2]
Ru Weight on steering input 0.01 [1/rad2]
RΔu Weight on steering input rate (Δ per Δt) 0.01 [1/rad2]
umin/max Steering input constraints ± 10 [deg]
Δumin/max steering input rate (per Δt) constraints ± .75 [deg]  (15 deg/s)
yymin/max Lateral position constraints  Scenario-dependent
ρε Weight on constraint violation 1 x 105 
V Variable constraint relaxation on vehicle position [1.25, ···, 1.25, 0.01]
 
Two common scenarios were used to analyze the performance of the autonomous 
system. In both, obstacles and hazards were represented to the driver by cones and lane 
markings and to the controller by a constrained corridor (with constraint mapping 
performed by “virtual sensors” and a priori high-level planning). Single hazard 
avoidance tests required that the vehicle avoid a roadway-restricting hazard on a straight 
roadway. Multiple hazard avoidance tests required that the vehicle navigate around two 
hazards with a double lane change maneuver. These scenarios are described below. 
Hazard avoidance tests required that the vehicle avoid an obstacle in the current 
lane of travel. In these tests, the vehicle was driven at a constant velocity in the center of 
a lane with the driver holding the steering wheel at δ = 0, as if asleep or inattentive. A 
row of cones blocked the vehicle’s lane of travel, requiring the controller to: 1) plan a 
safe lane change maneuver around them, 2) assess the threat posed by that maneuver, and 
3) intervene as necessary to avoid the hazard. Figure 2.15 illustrates this test setup. 
 
Figure 2.15: Hazard avoidance test setup showing hazard cone placement (large 
circles) and lane boundaries (dashed) enforced by the controller 
Multiple hazard avoidance experiments tested the controller’s ability to navigate 
more complex road/hazard setups that required maneuvers with appreciable load transfer. 
In these tests (illustrated in Figure 2.16), both lanes of travel were blocked at different 
locations, forcing the vehicle to change lanes to avoid the first hazard, then change lanes 
again to avoid the second, as in a double lane change maneuver. 
 
Figure 2.16: Multiple hazard avoidance test setup showing hazard cone placement 
(circles) and lane boundaries (dashed) 
2.4.2 Experimental Results 
Experimental results closely matched those achieved in simulation. In each 
experiment, the control system successfully maneuvered the vehicle through a 
constrained corridor (i.e. around hazards) while minimizing front wheel sideslip. Figure 
2.17 shows the results of autonomous hazard avoidance experiments conducted at V = 14 
and 10 m/s. 
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Figure 2.17: Autonomous hazard avoidance experiments at 10 and 14 m/s  
Notice that both experiments successfully avoided the corner of the hazard while 
smoothing the avoidance maneuver (to reduce front wheel sideslip). Also note that the 
prediction horizon distance scales with velocity (p samples spaced by ΔtMPC span 
). This velocity scaling allows the controller to effectively “see” the 
hazard from a greater distance when the vehicle is traveling faster, which in turn allows 
the controller to find and follow a smoother path around the hazard. The third subplot of 
ptVx MPChostpred ⋅Δ⋅=
Figure 2.17 shows how a 40-sample prediction horizon at 14 m/s compares to a 35-
sample prediction horizon at 10 m/s. At the higher speed, lateral acceleration is reduced 
due to a combination of 5 additional prediction samples and an extended preview 
distance. 
Figure 2.18 shows the results of multiple hazard avoidance experiments at varying 
velocities and through various corridors. In each experiment, the autonomous controller 
successfully kept the vehicle within the corridor. Notice that even with a shorter (less 
computationally-expensive) prediction horizon of 35 samples, the experiment conducted 
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at 10 m/s (Figure 2.18 c) foresaw and began to maneuver around the hazard while still at 
a distance of 17.5 meters – earlier than the 10 meters from which the 5 m/s, 40-sample 
horizon experiment first saw the hazard. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 2.18: Autonomous multiple hazard avoidance experiments at V = 14 (a), V = 
10 (b), and V = 5 (c) m/s 
2.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a constrained optimal controller that both plans and 
tracks a best case (with respect to some user-defined criteria) trajectory through a 
constrained corridor. This corridor-keeping controller has been shown in simulation and 
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experiment to safely navigate around both static and moving hazards while satisfying 
actuator constraints and minimizing sideslip at the front wheels. Various objective 
function and constraint setups have been presented and their results discussed. The 
controller developed in this chapter now serves as a foundation for the threat assessment 
and semi-autonomous control presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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3 CHAPTER 3: THREAT ASSESSMENT  
3.1 Introduction 
The semi-autonomous vehicle navigation framework presented in this thesis was 
designed specifically for semi-autonomous control of passenger vehicles. The optimal-
control-based method that it uses to get from sensor information (and corresponding 
corridor boundaries) to controller intervention, however, also provides a metric for 
analyzing the threat posed to the vehicle by a given scenario. This metric is comparable 
to and in many situations more useful/accurate than existing metrics. This chapter 
explains. 
The basic premise of threat assessment is as follows. First, sensing systems such 
as radar, LIDAR, or cameras are used to detect, classify, and track objects in the host 
vehicle’s vicinity. Once these potential hazards have been localized and their motion has 
been estimated, a threat metric is used to predict (or “assess”) the threat they pose to the 
host vehicle. Many threat assessment technologies are designed to then trigger and/or 
implement countermeasures to reduce the threat. These countermeasures can be passive 
or active. Examples of passive countermeasures include driver warning [35,79] and 
seatbelt pretensioning [80]. Active countermeasures include braking [27], steering 
[30,31], and other forms of actuation that seek to reduce the threat by altering the host 
vehicle’s trajectory. The effectiveness of both passive and active threat assessment and 
countermeasures depends on their ability to correctly identify hazards and accurately 
assess the threat those hazards pose to the host vehicle. 
Threat metrics described in the literature predominantly use time-based, distance-
based, and deceleration-based measures to characterize the threat level of a given 
 scenario. Time-based threat measures project time to collision (TTC) based on current 
speeds, positions, trajectories, and (in some formulations) other vehicle states [47,48,81]. 
Distance-based metrics are generally calculated using prevailing range and vehicle speeds 
and require constant velocity/acceleration assumptions and simple hazard geometry 
[50,51]. Finally, acceleration-based metrics assess the threat of a given maneuver based 
on the minimum (and often assumed constant) lateral or longitudinal acceleration that a 
simple avoidance maneuver would require, given the current position, velocity, and 
acceleration of both host and hazard [46,49]. In [46], the inventors estimate the lateral 
acceleration required to execute a constant radius evasive maneuver. Their 
implementation then compares this acceleration to a threshold value. When the required 
acceleration reaches this threshold, braking countermeasures are implemented to reduce 
the vehicle’s longitudinal velocity. 
While the above threat metrics have been shown to provide useful estimates of the 
danger posed by a given maneuver, they are not well suited to consider multiple hazards, 
complex vehicle dynamics, or complicated environmental geometry with its attendant 
constraints. The geometrically-simple (straight-line or constant-radius-curve) avoidance 
maneuvers assumed by these metrics may also misestimate the true threat posed by 
scenarios where the optimal avoidance trajectory follows a curve of varying radius or 
non-constant velocity/acceleration.  
In contrast, calculating instantaneous threat from an MPC-derived optimal 
avoidance trajectory inherently considers multiple hazards, actuator limitations/effects, 
measured disturbances, and (using nonlinear MPC), variable vehicle velocities and 
accelerations. Configuring the controller to plan a (sideslip-minimizing) trajectory within 
a safe region of travel ensures that the MPC-based threat assessment provides a true “best 
case” instantaneous threat assessment. In a driver warning context, threshold threat 
values may trigger driver warnings at critical/desired threat thresholds. For semi-
autonomous control via computer control, threat assessment may be used to determine 
when and how strongly to intervene. The latter application is the topic of the next 
chapter. This chapter focuses on the design and development of the threat assessment 
metric itself. 
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3.2 Optimal-Control-Based Threat Assessment 
Chapter 2 presented the design of a corridor-based trajectory-planning method 
based on constrained optimal control. When the objective function and constraints are 
defined as described in 2.3.1, the vehicle path calculated at each time step by the MPC 
controller is assumed to be the best case or safest path through the environment. Key 
metrics from this prediction may be used to assess the instantaneous threat posed to the 
vehicle.  
The MPC objective function can be configured to force the constrained optimal 
solutions to satisfy corridor constraints before minimizing front wheel sideslip. This 
hierarchy of objectives is achieved by setting constraint violation weights (ρε) 
significantly higher than the competing minimization weight (Rαα) on front slip. Then 
when constraints are not active, as illustrated by the gray vehicle in Figure 3.1, front 
wheel sideslip – and the corresponding threat – remains low. When the solution is 
constrained, predicted front wheel sideslip increases with the severity of the maneuver 
required to remain within the navigable corridor. The dark vehicle in Figure 3.1 
illustrates how the MPC-predicted optimal vehicle trajectory might appear as the lateral 
acceleration, tire slip angles and corresponding threat increase in the presence of an 
active constraint.  
Physical limits on tire cornering friction dictate maximum safe angles of wheel 
sideslip. These angles provide an objective limit against which predicted sideslip may be 
normalized; when predicted threat approaches this known limit, loss of stability is 
imminent. This inherent limitation on stability-critical states such as front wheel slip 
makes them particularly well suited as objective threat assessors.  
 
Figure 3.1: Obstacle avoidance scenario showing MPC trajectory plans with varying 
levels of required front wheel sideslip corresponding to varying levels of threat 
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3.2.1 Threat Calculation 
Various norms may be used to reduce the vector of predicted vehicle states xv  to a 
scalar threat metric  (instantaneous threat assessment at time k). In this work, the 
performance of several norms was studied. 
( )kxvΦ
Table 3.1 describes how each was calculated. 
Table 3.1. Norms used to reduce predicted states to a scalar threat metric ( )kxvΦ  
Symbol Description Calculation 
( )kx 0vΦ  First / nearest predicted x ( ) 10 += kx xkvΦ  
( )kx1vΦ  Average predicted state xv  ( )
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( )kx∞vΦ  Maximum predicted state xv  ( ) xkx vv max=∞Φ  
 
3.2.2 Control Horizons 
The length of the MPC prediction and control horizons (p and n respectively) 
influences both the size and profile of predicted vehicle states xv . Longer horizons “see” 
hazards sooner and allow the controller more distance over which to plan an evasive 
maneuver. The number and placement of control inputs determined by n and Jm (2.5), 
respectively, also affect the evasive maneuver and its attendant threat assessment. 
3.2.3 Threat Metrics 
Just as various vehicle states may be penalized in the objective function without 
significantly changing the MPC-generated trajectory plan (as discussed in 2.3.2 I), these 
states may also be used interchangeably to assess threat posed by a given trajectory 
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prediction. In this chapter, threat assessment based on lateral acceleration ( yayx
v&&vv ≡= ), 
front wheel slip ( αvv =x ), and a modified objective function cost ( SIJx
vv = ) are compared.  
While lateral acceleration is commonly used in existing threat metrics, front 
wheel slip was chosen based on three observations. First, front wheel slip is directly tied 
to, and tends to be a good indicator of, vehicle stability and controllability by front wheel 
steering. Second, available surface friction places a measureable limit on how large front 
wheel slip angles can become before loss of control is imminent. This limit provides a 
useful benchmark against which threat assessments can be compared to assess maneuver 
stability. Finally, when the cost function’s only state objective is to minimize front wheel 
slip (while remaining within corridor- and actuator-imposed constraints), the path 
prediction explicitly minimizes the very metric used to assess threat. This hierarchy of 
objectives – remain within the corridor while minimizing front slip as much as possible – 
thereby provides a “best case” or minimal-threat assessment from a dynamically-feasible 
maneuver. 
For some scenarios, however, the controller may not completely satisfy position 
constraints, making α an incomplete indicator of the true anticipated threat. These 
scenarios may arise when complex corridors cause constraints such as maximum input 
value or maximum input rate to activate. In these situations, the MPC-predicted vehicle 
path may violate position constraints, making Φα = f(αpredicted) an incomplete threat 
assessment since it does not does not capture the additional threat posed by the predicted 
departure from the navigable corridor. To account for such scenarios, an alternative threat 
metric similar to the objective function cost may be used, where SIJx
vv = , with SIJ
v
 
defined as 
(3.1)
This threat metric, while somewhat more difficult to interpret physically, accounts 
for the additive presence of the various objective function considerations, such as 
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constraints, input costs, etc, and increases rapidly when constraints are violated. This rate 
of intervention is tuned independent of the controller cost function by introducing a 
modified (and adjustable) constraint violation weight, ρSI. From (2.3), the cost-based 
prediction SIJ
v
 is related to the predicted front wheel sideslip by 
( ) ( )ααααα αα vvv vvvvv rRrJ T −−=~ . (3.2)
With 0=αrv , this relation allows the cost-based threat assessment SIJvΦ  to be mapped to 
an equivalent (and physically-bounded) front-wheel-slip-based assessment  via  JΦ
ααR
SIJ
J
vΦ=Φ . (3.3)
Simulation results below show how these prediction calculations, threat metrics, 
and prediction horizons affect the threat assessment. 
3.3 Simulation Setup 
Two hazard avoidance scenarios were simulated to compare various threat 
assessments to a simple metric that assumes a constant radius turn (CRT). The first was a 
single hazard avoidance scenario in which the vehicle drove toward and maneuvered 
around a single hazard represented by a corner in the constraint corridor (Figure 3.2 a). 
The second was a lane change maneuver in which the vehicle was required not only to 
avoid the first hazard, but to then perform the equivalent of a single lane change in order 
to remain within the constrained corridor (Figure 3.2 b). 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3.2: Illustration of hazard avoidance (a) and lane-change (b) maneuvers used 
in threat assessment simulations 
Two types of simulation were conducted. In the first, threat was assessed as the 
vehicle traveled directly through a road hazard rather than attempting to avoid it. These 
“passive” tests compared the lateral acceleration calculated by the MPC-based framework 
to that estimated by a CRT and illustrated the effect of prediction calculations, controller 
horizons, and threat metric choices on this framework’s threat assessment.  
The second set of tests studied how closely predicted threat (which was based on 
the MPC controller’s prediction of future vehicle states) matched true threat/states when 
the controller navigated the vehicle autonomously. Except for prediction horizon p, 
control horizon n, and constraint relaxation V, these tests used the same controller 
parameters as those described in Table 2.2. Table 3.2 lists the horizon lengths and 
relaxation vectors used in these simulations. 
Table 3.2: Controller parameters tested in threat assessment simulations 
Symbol Description Value [units]
p Prediction horizon {30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60} [steps]
n Control horizon {2, p/2, p} [steps]
V Variable constraint relaxation on vehicle position 
[1 x 10-20… 1 x 10-20]
[1 x 10-5… 1 x 10-5]
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 In the context of autonomous control, threat assessment evaluation criteria change 
slightly. Whereas passive threat assessment seeks to describe threat with respect to a 
“best possible” maneuver, threat assessment in the presence of active countermeasures 
must also consider the planned avoidance maneuver’s similarity to what the controlled 
vehicle can actually achieve or will actually experience. For other threat assessment 
metrics (e.g. CRT-based prediction), this comparison of expected to actual threat 
becomes less useful for two reasons: first, threat assessors that assume CRTs rarely 
implement a control law that seeks to follow that CRT [27,46]. When they do implement 
active countermeasures, these systems more often seek to avoid the hazard by non-CRT-
compatible means such as braking or combined braking and steering. This disconnect 
between what is actually predicted and what the controller seeks to achieve inherently 
changes the utility of a threat assessment since it no longer represents an true/achievable 
maneuver, but instead only some notion of how close the vehicle is to collision.  
The framework developed in this thesis was designed with the intention of 
providing a best case – and achievable – threat assessment. That is, given a set of initial 
conditions, the threat predicted by the optimal trajectory is presumably attainable if the 
MPC-calculated inputs are implemented. Thus, autonomously-controlled hazard 
avoidance and lane change maneuvers were used in addition to similar maneuvers 
without active countermeasures to assess how closely this framework’s predicted best 
case threat matched the true values of the metric on which it was based (ie. how closely 
true front wheel slip at a given point represents the predicted front wheel slip at the same 
point). 
3.4 Simulation Results 
Simulation results for various threat calculations, prediction/control horizons, and 
threat metrics are shown below. First, simulations that did not implement active 
countermeasures are presented to compare the proposed framework’s threat assessment to 
that predicted by a CRT. Results from similar scenarios using an MPC-based autonomous 
control are then presented. 
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3.4.1 Threat Assessment without Active Countermeasures 
The MPC-based threat assessor provided an accurate prediction of the threat 
posed by single hazard avoidance and lane change scenarios. The results below 
demonstrate its efficacy in each. 
I) Single Hazard Avoidance 
Figure 3.3 shows the results of a single hazard avoidance test with no active 
countermeasures, a prediction horizon of 40 samples, and a control horizon of the same 
length. Lateral vehicle acceleration ( yayx
v&&vv ≡= ) was used as the threat metric in order to 
compare this framework’s assessments to those predicted by a CRT.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Threat assessment comparison 
Notice that the “0” norm of the optimal maneuver’s prediction most closely 
resembles the CRT assessment. This similarity arises from the MPC calculation, whose 
first prediction is calculated based on the current steer angle (which is constant between 
samples). This constant steer angle roughly translates to a short-lived (one time sample 
 long) CRT and thereby causes the framework’s predicted lateral acceleration to closely 
mirror the CRT’s. Also note that the ∞ norm causes this framework’s threat assessment 
to increase at roughly the same rate, though slightly earlier than the CRT assessment.  
The average and root mean square norms on predicted sideslip both match the 
CRT assessment when the hazard is initially detected and then again just before the 
steering constraints activate. This is due to the fact that when the hazard is first detected, 
the objective-function-minimizing avoidance maneuver exhibits a relatively-constant 
radius of curvature. This causes both average and root mean square values to mimic the 
acceleration required by a CRT. As soon as the end of the prediction passes the corner of 
the hazard (x ≈ 114 m), the controller begins to relax its predicted inputs and required 
lateral acceleration on all positions with x > 114 m. This causes the threat assessment 
based on these norms to decrease. Just before the steering constraints activate, the 
predicted maneuver becomes infeasible, the steering angle reaches its limit, and predicted 
lateral acceleration from the resultant vehicle trajectory peaks at a constant value similar 
to what the CRT requires at that location.  
Figure 3.4 shows the trajectories, threat assessments, and steering inputs 
calculated by the controller, along with each prediction’s location (k) within the 
prediction horizon p. Notice that when the hazard was first “seen”, the controller planned 
an avoidance trajectory of relatively constant lateral acceleration as mentioned above. 
From , this path plan required increasing levels of lateral acceleration 
initially while tapering off to low lateral acceleration past the hazard. Also notice that 
because the ∞ norm selects the maximum lateral acceleration resulting from any two 
(possibly unequal) steer commands over the prediction horizon, it provides a more 
conservative estimate of threat in this particular scenario than the CRT-based assessment. 
For generous steering rate constraints, this result is expected to be common to most other 
scenarios. 
85~100~ ≤≤ hostx
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Figure 3.4: Predicted vehicle trajectories and attendant threat assessments and 
optimal steering inputs 
Figure 3.5 shows the result of varying prediction horizon on threat assessments 
calculated from the lateral acceleration metric. As these plots illustrate, lengthening the 
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 prediction horizon tends to change primarily the distance from which the hazard is first 
detected. As soon as the controller “sees” it, regardless of the prediction horizon length, 
the lateral acceleration required to avoid it jumps to a value similar to that required by a 
CRT. Controllers with each of these prediction horizons, metrics, and threat calculations 
then follow the same threat line until the steering constraints activate at δ = 10 deg.  
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Figure 3.5: Effect of prediction horizon (p) on threat assessments 
The length of the control horizon (n) was shown to exert relatively little influence 
on this framework’s threat assessment. Only at very small values (n = 2), did this 
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 parameter appreciably affect the threat assessment and then only for long (p > 45) 
prediction horizons. Figure 3.6 illustrates. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 3.6: Threat assessments resulting from n=p (a), n=p/2 (b), and n=2 (c)  
The drop in predicted threat observed for the third set (n=2) of prediction-control 
horizons is the result of the controller’s attempt to plan an objective-function-optimal 
path around the hazard using only two control inputs. Once avoiding the hazard using 
two inputs becomes impossible (x≈100 m), the optimal solution seeks to minimize total 
constraint violation using maneuver that requires a lower lateral acceleration. Figure 3.7 
shows the optimal trajectories and steering inputs calculated when p = 60 and n = 2. 
Chapter 3: Threat Assessment 63 
 
Figure 3.7: Predicted vehicle trajectories and attendant steering inputs 
Notice that Jm in these simulations allocated both control inputs at the first two 
steps of the optimal control calculation, causing the controller to calculate a large control 
input for the first step, followed by a reduced input for the second. Steering rate limits 
constrained the step change between these two inputs and thus led to a solution requiring 
greater vehicle sideslip than would be required had more control inputs been allowed or 
the inputs been spaced differently. It is not unreasonable to expect that, with real-time 
adaptation of Jm, the threat assessment for n=2 could be decreased, but for threat 
assessment purposes, this configuration provides a conservative estimate of threat. 
II) Lane Change 
For lane change maneuvers, the MPC-based framework correctly assessed a 
slightly higher threat than the CRT prediction as the vehicle approached the road hazard. 
Whereas the CRT maneuver predicts only the lateral acceleration required to avoid the 
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 corner of the first hazard, the MPC-based assessment also accounts for the lateral 
acceleration required to avoid leaving the road surface after the first hazard has been 
avoided. Figure 3.8 compares the threat calculated using various norms and prediction 
horizons to the CRT assessment. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3.8: Lane change maneuvers without active intervention showing how the 
proposed framework’s threat assessment varied by (a) threat calculation and (b) 
prediction horizon 
As Figure 3.8 illustrates, the threat assessed by the ∞-norm in this scenario rises 
sharply as soon as the opposite road edge is detected. When the driver does not respond 
or correct course as in this simulation, predicted threat settles to a lower value for the 
same reasons as discussed above (trajectory cost minimization). Meanwhile, the CRT-
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based threat assessment considers only the corner of the nearest hazard, causing its 
prediction to completely miss the additional lateral acceleration required to level off in 
the avoidance lane. Figure 3.9 illustrates how infeasible initial conditions caused by 
driver (and controller) inaction affect the control inputs and predicted trajectories 
computed by this MPC formulation. 
 
Figure 3.9: Predicted vehicle trajectories and attendant steering inputs for a lane 
change maneuver, p=40, n=40  
Notice that as soon as the maneuver can no longer satisfy position constraints, the 
controller saturates both δ and Δδ in a vain attempt to guide the vehicle back onto the 
navigable road surface. As soon as these constraints activate, the predicted threat 
saturates. 
The above results show that the MPC-based threat assessment provided by the 
proposed framework gives a similar, albeit more situation- and plant-aware threat 
assessment to that based on a constant radius turn. When calculated from the maximum 
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 MPC-predicted lateral acceleration (∞-norm), these predictions provide slightly earlier 
warning which explicitly accounts for more complex hazard geometry and more realistic 
actuator limits. 
3.4.2 Threat Assessment with Autonomous Control 
As mentioned in 3.3, assessing threat based on a controller-achievable maneuver 
requires some measure of how well the predicted threat/state represents what the vehicle 
would actually experience under autonomous control. This relationship between 
predicted threat and the controller’s ability to maintain true threat at or below this level 
plays an important role in the semi-autonomous control implementation discussed in 
Chapter 4. Below, threat assessments using various controller and prediction parameters 
are compared to the true vehicle state and shown to provide a reliable estimate of the 
vehicle’s true states under autonomous control. 
I) Single Hazard Avoidance 
Figure 3.10 shows how predicted front wheel sideslip (Φα) as assessed by various 
prediction norms compares to true front wheel sideslip (α). 
 
Figure 3.10: Threat assessment using the front wheel slip metric 
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As Figure 3.10 illustrates, threat assessment based on the next available sample of 
front wheel slip (Φ0α) most closely estimated the true threat at that location. This is not 
surprising as the “0” norm samples the vehicle’s next predicted state (5 ms forward in 
time) from the vehicle’s current state. Notice in the third subplot that the ratio of 
predicted-to-true slip from this norm is nearly unity leading up to the hazard. This close 
correlation between prediction and reality also implies that for the low sideslip and yaw 
angles experienced in this maneuver, the linear controller model closely approximates the 
plant. 
Figure 3.10 also shows that the ∞-norm closely approximates the true vehicle 
state from almost the moment the hazard is “seen” at x≈85 m to the point at which the 
host vehicle successfully clears the hazard corner (x≈114 m). This close correlation is 
also apparent in the third subplot where the ∞-norm result is nearly overlayed with the 
“0”-norm result at 1pred =αα true . The only significant difference between the ∞- and the 
“0” norms here is that the former anticipates the hazard slightly earlier and adjusts its 
threat assessment accordingly. This anticipation, together with the ∞-norm’s accurate 
prediction of true front wheel slip (or the slip to be expected if the controller is given full 
control authority) make it an especially useful norm for governing semi-autonomous 
control. The ∞-norm is thus used exclusively in the simulations and experiments 
presented in Chapter 4. 
Figure 3.11 shows how threat assessment based on lateral acceleration performs 
in an autonomous control context. 
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Figure 3.11: Threat assessment using the lateral acceleration metric 
Notice that while threat assessments based on the 
ya
Φ  metric lead true lateral 
acceleration (similar to those predicted by Φα), they fail to accurately capture the 
magnitude of this state as evidenced in the third subplot. Where for Φα-based threat 
assessment, this ratio of true-to-predicted state was nearly unity for the ∞- and “0”-
norms, the -based assessment exhibits ratios closer to 1.7. This may evidence greater 
sensitivity in this metric to model mismatch, further warranting the use of Φα- or ΦJ-
based metrics for threat assessment and semi-autonomous control.  
ya
Φ
Figure 3.12 shows how modified objective function cost (with α weighted in the 
objective function) performs as a threat metric. 
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Figure 3.12: Threat assessment using the objective function cost metric 
Similar to Φα, ΦJ accurately predicts front wheel sideslip when used in 
conjunction with both the ∞- and “0”-norms. The only significant difference between 
these two metrics occurs at x≈113 m. At this location, the predicted vehicle trajectory 
slightly violates the corner of the ymin constraint, causing a spike in JSI and a 
corresponding spike in ΦJ. This slight constraint violation, while not unexpected when 
position constraints are softened, may be accounted for by providing a “buffer region” 
around hazards when defining constraint positions. 
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 Figure 3.13 shows the effect of prediction horizon on threat assessments Φα and 
ΦJ. Notice that as prediction horizon increases, the autonomous MPC controller 
effectively smoothes the avoidance maneuver in order to reduce both steering inputs and 
front wheel sideslip (which are both penalized in the objective function). This control 
input smoothing affects both predicted and actual threat in a similar fashion, leading to 
nearly identical xvΦα  ratios for each metric. From a robustness standpoint, this is 
desirable as it suggests that the autonomous MPC controller configured as described in 
Chapter 2 can be used to plan, predict, and track optimal (i.e. threat-minimizing) 
trajectories through a constrained corridor. This ability is key to the semi-autonomous 
control method described in the next chapter. 
 
Figure 3.13: Threat assessment using Φα and ΦJ for varying prediction horizons 
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II) Lane Change 
Figure 3.14 shows the result of threat assessment using the ∞ norm of the Φα and 
ΦJ metrics in a lane change maneuver. 
 
Figure 3.14: Threat assessment using Φα and ΦJ for varying prediction horizons in a 
lane change maneuver 
Notice that between x≈60 and x≈70, the true front sideslip decreases sharply as 
the vehicle clockwise right to remain within the narrow corridor. Meanwhile, the threat 
prediction increases in anticipation of the corrective maneuver required to remain within 
the corridor. This leads to a temporary reduction in xvΦα . As the vehicle passes the 
corner of the first hazard at x ≈ 85m, true slip once again matches predicted slip. These 
72  Chapter 3: Threat Assessment  
 Chapter 3: Threat Assessment 73 
results suggest that the MPC controller may be configured to accurately plan, assess, and 
track aggressive maneuvers using Φ∞α and Φ∞J metrics. 
3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has developed a method for assessing the threat posed by a given 
scenario from the trajectory plan of a constrained MPC controller. This method has been 
compared to others that assume a constant radius turn (CRT) avoidance maneuver. When 
hazard geometry is simple, this method’s prediction closely mirrors and slightly preempts 
the CRT-based assessment. For more complex hazard avoidance scenarios, such as those 
requiring a lane change maneuver, this method is shown to account for the increased 
threat, thus providing a significant improvement over simple CRT-based assessments. 
The principal contribution of this chapter was the demonstration of this method’s 
ability to accuracy predict an MPC-controlled vehicle’s performance as it tracks the 
MPC-predicted trajectory plan through a constrained corridor. Two metrics are shown to 
provide a nearly one-to-one mapping of predicted threat to true threat, suggesting that, if 
provided full control of a vehicle, this MPC controller can reasonably be expected to 
maintain critical vehicle states/threat at or below their predicted values. Chapter 4 
explains why this is important to the design of the overall semi-autonomous system. 
Note that in this chapter, only results from MPC controllers penalizing front 
wheel slip in the objective function (Rαα >0) were shown. For a comparison of predictions 
obtained using this objective function setup to an objective function that penalizes lateral 
acceleration rather than front wheel slip ( >0), see Appendix B. 
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4 CHAPTER 4: SEMI-AUTONOMOUS CONTROL  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the final component of the semi-autonomous framework: a 
shared control scheme for active hazard avoidance. The controller described here builds 
on the methods for path planning and threat assessment described in Chapters 2 and 3. 
The resulting control framework provides a powerful means of semi-autonomously 
avoiding road hazards. 
4.1.1 Intervention Law 
Given a best case vehicle path through the environment (Chapter 2) and a 
corresponding threat assessment (Chapter 3), a semi-autonomous intervention law 
determines how much control authority to allocate to the driver and how much to allocate 
to the MPC controller. This allocation is based on the scalar threat assessment Φ. 
Generally speaking, low predicted threat causes more of the driver’s input and less of the 
controller’s input to be applied to the vehicle while high threat allows controller input to 
dominate that of the driver. An intervention function is defined to allow for a smooth 
blending of driver and controller inputs. 
Denoting the current driver input by udr and the current controller input by uMPC, 
the blended input seen by the vehicle, uv , is defined as 
( ) ( )( ) drMPCv uKuKu Φ−+Φ= 1  (4.1)
The intervention function K(Φ) translates predicted vehicle threat Ф into a scalar 
blending gain ], defined as  [ 10∈K
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As shown in (4.2), the shape of K is described by the threat level at which the 
MPC controller engages (Φeng) and the level at which the MPC control system assumes 
full authority and effectively acts as an autonomous controller (Φaut).  When the predicted 
threat Φ is less than the low-threat threshold Φeng, K is set to zero, effectively passing all 
of the driver’s control input (and none of the controller’s) to the vehicle. Above the high-
threat threshold Φaut, K is set to one. This allows the MPC controller full control authority 
to autonomously track the high-threat path. Once the predicted threat is reduced to a 
safe(r) level (i.e. below Φaut), the driver’s control authority is increased. 
In this chapter, linear and piecewise linear intervention functions are employed, 
though nonlinear formulations – including some with dependence on 
controller/plant/environmental parameter dynamics – have also been tested. In the results 
below, linear and piecewise linear intervention functions were parameterized by Φeng and 
Φaut as in (4.3). Figure 4.1 illustrates gain (K) as a function of threat (Φ) for various forms 
of f(Φ). 
( )
engaut
autf Φ−Φ
Φ−Φ=Φ  (4.3)
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Figure 4.1: Intervention laws used to translate threat assessments into controller 
blending gains 
The intervention threshold Φeng may be chosen based on driver preference. 
Increasing Φeng widens the “low threat” band in which the driver’s inputs are unaffected 
by the controller. While this provides greater driver freedom for low-threat situations, this 
freedom comes at the cost of increasing the rate of controller intervention when Φeng is 
exceeded. This increased rate of intervention may adversely affect driver experience, as 
discussed in the results below. 
Increasing the value of Φaut, on the other hand, delays complete controller 
intervention until more severe maneuvers are predicted. This threshold can be set to 
ensure the controlled maneuvers remain feasible. When physically-limited states, such as 
front wheel sideslip α or modified objective function cost JSI, are used for threat 
assessment, Φaut may be set at known stability limits of these states. In the case of front 
wheel sideslip, the friction-limited bounds on the linear region of the tire force curve 
(2.11) suggest Φaut ≤ 5º on surfaces with a friction coefficient μ = 1. Setting Φaut ≤ 5º thus 
places an effective limit on the amount of front wheel sideslip allowed in semi-
autonomous operation. By the time the predicted hazard avoidance maneuver reaches this 
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level of severity, the controller has full control authority and can – unless unforeseen 
constraints dictate otherwise – guide the vehicle to safety.  
When controller intervention is based on ΦJ (rather than Φα), control authority 
gains become coupled with the “optimal” MPC solution. With an appropriate cost 
function formulation and choice of ρSI, this guarantees that 1) the threat metric regulating 
controller intervention is minimized in the path planning process (and associated control 
calculation) and 2) the controller maintains complete control authority when constraints 
are binding. Note that due to the additive presence of other objective function terms such 
as constraints and input costs, intervention based on SIJ
v
 may cause  to reach 
threshold values Φeng  and Φaut before the predictive state α reaches a critical level. This 
behavior is by design, since constraint violation is seen as an added threat warranting 
additional control intervention. For this reason, similar thresholds are used below to 
govern slip-based (Φα) and cost-based (ΦJ) intervention. 
JΦ
4.1.2 Driver Input Consideration 
In some scenarios, driver inputs may differ significantly from controller inputs. 
Such cases can lead to abrupt adjustments in the overall steering input (uv) as K increases. 
These abrupt changes may saturate steering rate constraints (which are limited by the 
available steering actuators) and may be uncomfortable and/or unnerving to the human 
driver. To account for differences between driver and controller input, K may be 
augmented by an additional term to increase controller intervention in proportion to the 
driver’s deviation from the best case input. This augmentation can be described by  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−Φ−+Φ=Φ Δ
−−
max11,, u
uu
drMPCaug
drMPC
effuuK (4.4)
where f(Φ) is defined as in (4.2) and Δumax represents the maximum difference between 
driver and controller inputs ( minmaxmax uuu )−=Δ . Figure 4.2 shows the effect of this 
modification on piecewise linear intervention laws. 
 
Figure 4.2: Intervention law showing the effect of augmenting K according to 
driver-controller input deviation 
4.2 Simulation Studies 
Semi-autonomous hazard avoidance was tested for various threat metrics (Φα and 
ΦJ), intervention thresholds (Φeng  and Φaut), and intervention laws (K and Kaug) for 
several avoidance maneuvers and diverse driver inputs. Simulation setup and results are 
presented below. 
4.2.1 Simulation Setup 
Controller performance was simulated using Plant B (described in 2.3.1). The 
vehicle model described by (2.26) – (2.29), with the parameters given in Table 2.1 was 
used in the receding horizon controller. Controller parameters were set as specified in 
Table 2.2. Both front-wheel-slip- and cost-based threat assessment were tested as inputs 
to the intervention law, with intervention thresholds Φeng and Φaut varied from 0 to 2 and 
2.5 to 5 degrees respectively. Blending gains K and Kaug were both tested to assess the 
effect of each on semi-autonomous system performance. 
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 I) Driver Input 
Open-loop and closed-loop driver inputs were tested. Open-loop inputs were 
simulated by pre-specifying a sequence of driver inputs and implementing this sequence 
independent of the resulting vehicle trajectory. The trajectory independence of these 
inputs was chosen to emulate an inattentive driver. For the tests below, the driver’s steer 
angle was held constant at δdr = 0º as though s/he did not see the impending hazard.  
Closed-loop inputs were used to emulate an attentive driver who actively attempts 
to track a desired trajectory. Here, a pure pursuit driver model similar to the one 
described in [82] was used. This model implements proportional feedback on the path 
tracking error, with the main tuning parameter being the lookahead distance L (illustrated 
in Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3: Illustration of pure pursuit driver model parameters 
In simulation, the lookahead distance L was reduced (or “de-tuned”) to simulate a 
poor driver input and increased (or tuned) to simulate an experienced driver. Together 
with the wheelbase length, this distance forms a gain on path error as shown in the 
steering calculation: 
( ) ( )Θ+= sin
 
2~
2L
xx
y rfδ . (4.5)
where ( ) ( )tytyy des −=~ . 
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Figure 4.4 shows a block diagram of the semi-autonomous controller with the 
pure pursuit driver in the loop. 
 
Figure 4.4: Block diagram of “pure pursuit” driver in the loop with MPC controller 
II) Maneuvers 
Lane-keeping, hazard avoidance, and multiple hazard avoidance maneuvers 
similar to those described in 2.3.1 IV) were used to test the semi-autonomous controller’s 
ability to share control with a human driver while keeping the vehicle within the safe 
corridor. With the exception of lane-keeping maneuvers – for which closed-loop driver 
inputs are difficult to credibly simulate – both open- and closed-loop driver inputs were 
tested with each maneuver. Simulations with moving hazards similar to those described 
in 2.3.1 V) were also tested.  
4.2.2 Simulation Results 
The semi-autonomous controller maintained the vehicle within the navigable 
corridor for each of the threat metrics, intervention thresholds, intervention laws, 
maneuvers, and driver inputs tested. Results from these simulations are shown below. 
I) Threat Metrics and Intervention Thresholds 
Control systems that intervened semi-autonomously according to the threat posed 
by front wheel sideslip (α) and objective function cost (J) were shown to successfully 
satisfy safety constraints while allowing significant driver control. In the rest of this 
chapter’s figures, Фα indicates simulations conducted using front wheel slip to assess 
threat and regulate controller intervention, while ФJ indicates simulations that used 
modified objective function cost. Such tests are also referred to as Фα-regulated and ФJ-
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 regulated maneuvers. Figures 4.5—4.8 show the results of semi-autonomous double lane 
change (or “multiple hazard avoidance”) simulations with driver steer input δdr=0. Figure 
4.5 compares the results of one such scenario when each metric is used to estimate threat 
and regulate controller intervention. For both maneuvers, Фeng = 0 and Фaut = 3. 
 
Figure 4.5: Comparison of controller intervention based on threat metrics Фα and 
ФJ when driver steer δdr = 0 
Notice in Figure 4.5 that Фα- and ФJ-regulated controllers perform similarly when 
the vehicle trajectory operates far away from constraints. Near constraints, the two 
diverge, as the additional cost terms in ФJ  (0.5 Rδ δ2 + 0.5 RΔδ Δδ2 + 0.5 ρSI ε2) cause 
higher peaks in K = f(ФJ) than those seen for K = f(Фα).  
Intervention laws with varying threat thresholds for controller engagement (Φeng) 
and full autonomy (Φaut) were also shown to satisfy lane constraints while honoring 
driver inputs whenever possible. Sideslip thresholds Φeng and Φaut (in units of degrees) 
are denoted in figure legends as [Φeng Φaut]. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.6: Effect of intervention thresholds [Φeng Φaut] on Фα-regulated double lane 
change maneuvers with δdr = 0 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.7: Effect of intervention thresholds [Φeng Φaut] on ФJ-regulated  double 
lane change maneuvers with δdr = 0 
As Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate, increasing Фeng delays controller intervention K 
at the cost of more rapid increases and more frequent saturation of the control authority 
allotment. This late intervention, while allowing the human driver greater autonomy far 
from constraints/hazards, may ultimately require more control authority to regain control 
of the vehicle if the driver does not make the correction on his/her own. For example, 
increasing Фeng from 0 to 2 deg as shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 ultimately increases the 
average intervention metric K over the entire maneuver by 0.9 % for Фα-regulated 
intervention and 7.0 % for ФJ -regulated intervention. This tradeoff between early, small, 
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and persistent intervention (low Фeng) and late, large, and periodic intervention (high 
Фeng) and their effect on average K over the entire maneuver is plotted in Figure 4.8. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.8: Effect of intervention thresholds [Φeng Φaut] on average intervention K 
for double lane change maneuvers regulated by Фα (column a) and ФJ (column b) 
As Figure 4.8 (a) and (b) show, average controller intervention generally 
decreases with increasing Фaut until Фaut ≈ 4.5º. When the controller waits until threat Фα 
> 4.5 deg to take full control of the vehicle, the intervention required to keep the vehicle 
inside the navigable corridor increases rapidly. This comes as a result of the rapid 
increase in front wheel slip near the boundary of the linear tire force curve (2.11) and 
establishes a natural upper limit on Фaut.  
Also notice that, for this scenario, the engagement threshold (Фeng) may be tuned 
according to driver preference without significantly affecting average overall 
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intervention. Taken together, these results suggest that for some maneuvers and driver 
inputs, this framework tends to “average out” controller intervention for various Фeng and 
Фaut settings, allowing for considerable driver preference tuning without dramatically 
changing the average K. In this scenario, for example, the maximum change in K(Фα) 
across the entire range of Фeng and Фaut was 0.09. 
These results also suggest that similar bounds on Фeng and Фaut may be applied 
when modified objective function cost (JSI) is used to assess threat and regulate controller 
intervention. As shown in Figure 4.8 (b), basing controller intervention K on ФJ changes 
average K over the entire maneuver by only 0.8 percent when compared to the Фα- 
regulated configuration (from ( ) 430.0=ΦαK to ( ) 427.0=Φ JK ). This result follows 
from the abovementioned performance similarities between the ФJ- and Фα- regulated 
configurations. Far from constraints, the two configurations perform similarly. Near the 
constraints, the spikes in K(ФJ) tend to correct the vehicle trajectory, ultimately reducing 
the need for further intervention. 
II) Threat Assessment 
Semi-autonomous control changes the degree to which the MPC-based “best 
case” threat assessment matches true vehicle states. That is, when the MPC controller is 
not given full control authority, the vehicle trajectory it predicts based on those inputs 
does not necessarily match the trajectory actually followed by the vehicle. While this 
does not affect the accuracy of the controller’s “best case” or “autonomously-achievable” 
threat assessment, it does illustrate one key effect of input scaling on prediction accuracy 
as discussed below.  
For the autonomous case (i.e. when K = 1), the ratio of true-to-predicted front 
wheel sideslip was shown in 3.4.2 to be close to unity for both Фα- and ФJ-based threat 
assessment. In the semi-autonomous case, with Фeng = 0º and Фaut = 3º, this ratio 
decreases from unity in inverse proportion to the level of control authority K given to the 
MPC input calculation. Figure 4.9 shows the results of a hazard avoidance maneuver with 
δdr = 0 and using a)  and b) ( αΦ= fK ) ( )JfK Φ= . 
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.9: Hazard avoidance simulations showing the effect of intervention gains K 
on threat assessment accuracy 
Notice that, in contrast to the results obtained using K=0 (i.e. no active 
countermeasures) and K=1 (i.e. autonomous control) shown in 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 
respectively, the ratio of true-to-predicted threat for these semi-autonomous simulations 
increases with increasing K values. This differs from the uncontrolled and autonomously-
controlled tests for which this ratio remained near unity for all of the prediction horizons 
tested. The difference in the semi-autonomous case is a result of input scaling; 
multiplying the MPC input by K < 1 changes (and in the case of δdr < δMPC decreases) the 
steering input seen by the vehicle. This difference in incremental steering input Δu 
accumulates as a difference in u, causing the true vehicle trajectory to more closely 
follow the path implied by the driver’s inputs. As a result, the vehicle experiences less 
front wheel sideslip than the optimal trajectory predicts. When K approaches 1, as seen in 
the simulations with short prediction horizons, the predicted threat level converges to the 
true threat level. 
Figure 4.9 also shows that trajectory-planning and threat assessment in the semi-
autonomous framework is more influenced by prediction horizon than similar 
autonomously-controlled (K=1) scenarios. When K=1, the MPC input closely tracks the 
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predicted trajectory (and its corresponding threat states) as long as the linearized 
controller model closely matches the plant. For this range of prediction horizons 
 and this hazard avoidance scenario, the controller model closely matches 
the plant. As a consequence, the predicted threat level closely matches the true threat 
level. For semi-autonomous simulations on the other hand, K is threat-dependent. Since 
predicted threat decreases with increasing prediction horizons (which provide a longer 
effective lookahead distance over which to smooth the avoidance maneuver), K also 
decreases with increasing prediction horizon. As mentioned above, the further K gets 
from 1, the more the predicted threat level may overestimate (for δdr < δMPC) or 
underestimate (for δdr > δMPC) true threat level, depending on the maneuver.  
{( 6030L=p })
To summarize, the MPC-predicted trajectory/threat closely matches the true 
MPC-controlled vehicle trajectory for maneuvers in which the controller model closely 
matches the plant. When MPC inputs are blended with driver inputs in proportion to 
predicted threat, the true vehicle trajectory begins to diverge from the “best case” 
prediction. This does not diminish the utility of using the MPC prediction for threat 
assessment; the best case maneuver at any instant remains the best case maneuver 
whether the human driver follows it or not. What it does show – albeit empirically – is 
that for high-threat maneuvers that require K=1, the MPC controller is able to closely 
track the optimal avoidance trajectory. This guarantees that as long as Φeng and Φaut are 
set to appropriately low values (i.e. within the range for which the MPC model closely 
approximates the plant), and the prediction horizon is long enough that the controller has 
sufficient time to plan avoidance trajectories around hazards, the semi-autonomous 
controller can prevent departure from the navigable road corridor and guide the vehicle to 
safety. 
III) Intervention Laws – K and Kaug 
Semi-autonomous simulations based on the augmented intervention law Kaug (4.4) 
were also shown to satisfy safety and stability requirements for various maneuvers and 
driver steering inputs. Figure 4.10 compares a semi-autonomous simulation that does not 
consider the driver-controller steering difference (K) to one that does (Kaug). Note that the 
large peak values of Kaug combined with small input differences (recall that δdriver = 0 for 
both simulations) leads to only slight differences in controller intervention for this 
maneuver. In these particular simulations, Φ = Φα and [Фeng  Фaut] = [0 3] deg. 
 
Figure 4.10: Comparison of semi-autonomous multiple hazard avoidance 
simulations based on intervention laws K and Kaug 
Figure 4.10 shows that for certain maneuvers, driver inputs, and intervention 
thresholds Фeng and Фaut, augmenting K does not necessarily increase the average 
controller intervention. In these particular simulations, the opposite is observed. This is 
due to the slightly increased intervention early in the maneuver by the augmented 
controller, which reduced its subsequent intervention at x ≈ 75m. Figure 4.11 shows how 
augmenting K according to variation between driver and controller steer affects average 
overall intervention for this maneuver. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 4.11: Effect of varying intervention thresholds [Φeng Φaut] on average 
intervention K (column a) and Kaug (column b) for double lane change 
As Figure 4.11 shows, the driver-input-aware intervention law Kaug often leads to 
a similar average intervention as that calculated by the driver-input-unaware K. Also 
notice that for this maneuver, intervention governed by Kaug is less affected by changes in 
Φaut than K due to the extra term ( )( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −Φ− Δ
−−
max11 u
uu drMPC
ef .  Notice that even for large 
values of Φaut – which for the unaugmented configuration led to delayed intervention and 
precipitous increases in K – the augmented controller was able to maintain relatively low 
average intervention over the entire maneuver.  
To summarize, augmenting the intervention law via (4.4) maintains similar 
average controller intervention to the unaugmented controller while allowing for higher 
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Φaut settings. As noted in 4.2.2 I) above (pg. 80), the ability of these threat metrics (Φα 
and ΦJ) and intervention laws (K and Kaug) to allow for a wide range of thresholds and 
intervention characteristics without significantly changing average controller intervention 
or maneuver feasibility allows for considerable driver-preference-based tuning. This 
provides a significant advantage in a consumer market which strongly emphasizes 
configurability and personalization. 
IV) Closed-Loop Drivers and Trajectory Stabilization 
In addition to ensuring that the vehicle remains within a navigable road corridor, 
the semi-autonomous control framework presented in this thesis also exhibits 
performance advantages similar to those of yaw and roll stability controllers. That is, not 
only does the controller intervene to arrest corridor departure, but it also maintains 
stability-critical states (such as front wheel sideslip) below a given threshold while doing 
so. Appropriate threshold settings place an effective limit on the sideslip allowed before 
the controller takes full control of the vehicle and attempts to stabilize the vehicle. This 
soft limit ensures that as soon as the vehicle trajectory required to remain within the safe 
corridor becomes sever enough to require high levels of slip, the controller has been 
given full control authority and may – barring the unanticipated effects of unmodeled 
disturbances – safely stabilize the vehicle. 
In the presence of a closed-loop “pure-pursuit” driver control, the moderating 
effect of semi-autonomous intervention on both the vehicle trajectory and driver input 
becomes apparent. Figure 4.12 shows one such simulation in which the semi-autonomous 
controller improved the driver’s ability to track a desired path. In this simulation, the pure 
pursuit driver model was designed with a short lookahead (L = 10 m). At Vhost=20 m/s, 
this corresponds to an effective lookahead horizon of 0.5 seconds, which for the pure 
pursuit controller lead to large steering gains and consequent difficulty in tracking the 
desired trajectory without loosing control of the vehicle.  
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Figure 4.12: Effect of semi-autonomous intervention on a closed-loop “pure-
pursuit” driver and vehicle trajectory 
In this scenario, including the semi-autonomous controller in the control loop 
reduces the magnitude of the driver’s inputs. Whereas a short lookahead distance and its 
attendant high steering gains (4.5) caused the unassisted driver to oversteer and loose 
control of the vehicle, the assisted driver was more moderate in its steer commands and 
thus maintained control of the vehicle. Moreover, allocating less than 50% of the 
available control authority to the MPC controller was sufficient to keep the vehicle inside 
the corridor and within 0.4 meters of the desired trajectory. The combined effect of both 
inputs (driver and controller) is a vehicle trajectory that more closely tracks the driver’s 
desired trajectory than either the pure pursuit controller or corridor-based MPC controller 
would have done on its own. Figure 4.13 compares the evolution of stability-critical 
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states including sideslip (β), yaw rate (ψ& ), roll angle (φ), and lateral acceleration ( ) 
resulting from driver-only (a) and semi-autonomous (b) control. Notice that under driver-
only control, the vehicle spins around completely at x≈100 m. 
y&&
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.13: Comparison of vehicle paths, steering inputs, and state evolution for 
assisted (b) and unassisted (a) closed-loop drivers 
It is important to note that improved path tracking is not entirely the result of the 
MPC controller’s actions; the controller seeks only to keep the vehicle within a navigable 
corridor, while the intervention law only allows it the required control authority in 
proportion to stability-related threat. Were the MPC controller to navigate the vehicle 
autonomously, the resulting trajectory would look similar to those shown in Figure 2.11 
(which minimize front wheel sideslip). The “assisted” (i.e. semi-autonomous) trajectory 
shown in Figure 4.12 tracks the desired trajectory specifically due to a control authority 
allocation that allows the driver significant freedom to track a desired path while 
allowing the MPC controller just enough control authority to stabilize and keep the 
vehicle within a navigable corridor. 
Finally, Figure 4.14 shows how predicted threat Φα compares to true front wheel 
sideslip in the semi-autonomous maneuver shown above (Figure 4.13 b). As discussed in 
4.2.2 II) above, this threat assessment temporarily leads and slightly overestimates true 
front wheel slip. 
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Figure 4.14: Predicted vs. true threat for a semi-autonomous simulation with a pure 
pursuit driver model in the loop 
Similar favorable results were obtained for various scenarios with a pure-pursuit 
driver in the loop. Figure 4.15 shows the effect of semi-autonomous control on a driver 
attempting to track a step in reference trajectory. This maneuver attempts to emulate the 
behavior of a driver who, upon noticing a hazard, performs a sudden (panicked) lane-
change maneuver to avoid it.  
Chapter 4: Semi-Autonomous Control 93 
 
Figure 4.15: Effect of semi-autonomous intervention on the inputs of a “startled” 
closed-loop driver 
Notice again that even in the presence of steering rate constraints (seen active in 
the linear segments of the steer command), the semi-autonomous controller successfully 
stabilizes the vehicle, allowing the emulated driver to closely track the intended path 
without leaving the navigable roadway. 
Figure 4.16 demonstrates similar advantages when the driver attempts to swerve 
within a lane. 
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Figure 4.16: Effect of semi-autonomous intervention on the inputs of a driver 
swerving in a lane 
As in other scenarios, this simulation shows that the controller is able to 
effectively assist the driver while taking less than 35% of the available control authority. 
Similar lane-keeping results were obtained the experiments presented in section 4.3.2. 
V) Moving Hazards 
In simulation studies, the semi-autonomous controller proved capable of avoiding 
moving hazards. One scenario is shown in Figure 4.17 below. Note that in the plots, the 
vehicle’s center of gravity lies at the leftmost edge of the predicted trajectory. The 
trajectory prediction is color-coded according to predicted front wheel sideslip and 
marked a sequence of bullets, with the exception of the step with the highest predicted 
sideslip – which is marked by a circle. 
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T1 = 1.05 sec 
T2 = 4.25 sec 
T3 = 5.95 sec 
T4 = 6.15 sec 
T5 = 7.80 sec 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Semi-autonomous control with moving hazards 
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In this scenario, the host vehicle initially trails obstacle 1 while both travel at 20 
m/s. At T1, obstacle 1 begins to decelerate, prompting the host vehicle to begin a passing 
maneuver at T2. At T3, the host clears the first obstacle and “sees” an accelerating 
obstacle 2 in the oncoming lane at T4. Adjusting quickly in response to the heightened 
threat, the semi-autonomous controller takes complete control of the vehicle and 
successfully guides it safely past the hazard. Note that by using the first-order-hold 
obstacle state estimation approach described by (2.35) and (2.37), the predicted collision 
time and location does not explicitly account for the acceleration of each hazard. Instead, 
it adjusts its estimate at each sampling instant according to the current velocity of each 
hazard. This adjustment is apparent in Figure 4.17 as a shift in the corridor boundaries as 
the hazards accelerate. 
4.3 Experimental Studies 
Experimental testing* was performed using a human-driver-operated test vehicle 
at Ford’s Dearborn Development Center on dry asphalt (μ ≈ 1) as described in Section 
2.4.1. An inertial and GPS navigation system was used to measure vehicle position, 
sideslip, yaw angle, and yaw rate while a 1 GHz dSPACE processor ran controller code 
and interfaced with steering actuators. As in simulations, lane data was assumed to have 
been derived from forward-looking sensors and therefore predefined virtually.  
Finally, while this setup’s AFS mechanism transmits a slight (and undesirable) 
torque feedthrough from the controller to the driver, exceptional results were obtained in 
semi-autonomous tests. Future implementations, however, may benefit from the use of 
active steering mechanisms that reduce this torque feedthrough such as Electronic Power 
Assist Steering (EPAS) or pure steer-by-wire. 
4.3.1 Experimental Setup 
Three common scenarios were used to analyze system performance. In each 
scenario, obstacles, hazards, and driver targets were represented to the driver by cones 
                                                 
* Experimental studies were carried out in collaboration with Steven Peters 
and lane markings and to the controller by a constrained corridor (with onboard sensing 
and constraint mapping assumed to have been performed previously by “virtual sensors” 
and high-level planners, respectively). Lane-keeping tests required a swerving driver to 
navigate a straight lane of constant width. Single hazard avoidance tests required that the 
vehicle avoid a roadway-restricting hazard on a straight roadway. Finally, multiple 
hazard avoidance tests required that the vehicle navigate around two hazards with a 
double lane change maneuver. These scenarios are described below. 
I) Scenarios 
Lane keeping experiments tested the threat assessment and intervention 
characteristics of the controller when the driver maneuvered inside and outside of a given 
lane. Six pairs of cones were set up along ~200 meters of a 3.35-meter-wide lane to guide 
the driver’s intended path and thus improve experimental repeatability. As shown in 
Figure 4.18 (not to scale), the second- and third sets of cones required the driver to steer 
the vehicle to the edge of the navigable lane while the final two targets required that he 
attempt to depart the lane. Lane boundaries illustrated below by dashed lines were 
enforced via lateral position constraints yymin/max in the controller. 
 
Figure 4.18: Lane keeping test setup showing circles where cones were placed to 
guide the human driver’s inputs. Lane boundaries delineated by dashed lines were 
represented as constraints yymin and yymax to the semi-autonomous controller 
In each of these tests, the driver attempted to maneuver through the cones. For 
maneuvers that remained inside the lane, little controller intervention was desirable. 
When the driver’s path came close to departing the lane, the controller intervened to keep 
the vehicle inside it. Of interest in this scenario were the inherent tradeoffs between 
tracking the human driver’s desired trajectory and remaining within the lane. 
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 The setup for hazard avoidance and multiple hazard avoidance experiments was 
similar to that described in Section 2.4.1. Hazard avoidance tests required that the vehicle 
avoid an obstacle in the current lane of travel. In these tests, the vehicle was driven at a 
constant velocity in the center of a lane with the driver holding the steering wheel at δ = 
0, as if asleep or inattentive. A row of cones blocked the vehicle’s lane of travel, 
requiring the controller to: 1) plan a safe lane change maneuver around them, 2) assess 
the threat posed by that maneuver, and 3) intervene as necessary to avoid the hazard. 
Figure 4.19 illustrates this test setup. 
 
Figure 4.19: Hazard avoidance test setup showing hazard cone placement (large 
circles) and lane boundaries (dashed) enforced by the controller 
Multiple hazard avoidance experiments tested the controller’s ability to navigate 
more complex road/hazard setups that required maneuvers with appreciable load transfer. 
In these tests (illustrated in Figure 4.20), both lanes of travel were blocked at different 
locations, forcing the vehicle to change lanes to avoid the first hazard, then change lanes 
again to avoid the second, as in a double lane change maneuver. 
 
Figure 4.20: Multiple hazard avoidance test setup showing hazard cone placement 
(circles) and lane boundaries (dashed) 
These tests were conducted using two different types of driver inputs. Drowsy or 
otherwise inattentive drivers were emulated by a constant driver steer input of zero 
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degrees. In these tests, the unassisted driver’s path formed a straight line that intersected 
with the obstacle(s). To represent an alert driver’s steering inputs, drivers were asked in 
separate tests to steer around stationary obstacles. The urgency of these driver steer 
events was varied – sometimes avoiding the obstacle(s) with a smooth input, others 
steering at the last minute, and still others, turning the wrong way into an obstacle. Of 
particular interest in such interactions were the controller’s intervention characteristics 
and the interaction between the controller and the driver. Experiments were conducted at 
vehicle velocities of 5, 10, and 14 meters per second. 
II) Controller Configuration 
The best-case path calculated by the MPC controller is influenced by the MPC 
objective function, constraint setup, and prediction and control horizons. Vehicle and 
controller parameters used in experiments were the same as those used in simulation 
(shown in (2.26) – (2.29) and Table 2.2, respectively). Various threat metrics (Φα and 
ΦJ), intervention thresholds (Φeng and Φaut), and intervention laws (K(Φ) and Kaug(Φ)) 
were tested in order to understand their effects on controller performance. Because 
prediction (p) and control (n) horizons strongly affect path planning, threat assessment, 
and controller intervention, these were also varied to assess their impact on overall 
system performance. In general, longer prediction horizons led to smoother optimal 
vehicle trajectory predictions and, consequently, lower threat assessments. Real time 
computation limits constrained the feasible prediction and control horizons used in field 
tests to 40- and 20- sampling periods, respectively, when 50 ms sampling periods were 
used. For consistency, only experiments using p = 40 and n = 20 are shown below.  
III) Intervention Law Configuration 
Front wheel sideslip α and modified objective function cost JSI were each used to 
assess threat. Threat metrics based on both of these predictors (Φα and ΦJ) were 
calculated using the motion plan generated by the MPC algorithm as described by Table 
3.1 and (3.3). Various threat thresholds (Фeng and Фaut) and both intervention laws (K(Φ) 
and Kaug(Φ)) were also tested to understand their effect on vehicle performance and driver 
experience.  
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 4.3.2 Experimental Results 
The semi-autonomous framework proved capable of keeping the vehicle within 
the safe region of travel for each of the scenarios tested, with three different human 
drivers, and using multiple combinations of threat metrics, intervention thresholds, and 
intervention laws. Unless otherwise noted, the driver steer input was zero for each of the 
experiments (with the exception of lane-keeping experiments) shown below. 
I) Threat Metrics and Intervention Thresholds 
Figure 4.21 shows the results of three Φα-regulated lane-keeping tests with 
varying intervention thresholds [Φeng Φaut]. Recall that in these tests, the driver was 
instructed to attempt to track the path traced here by a black dashed line. 
 
Figure 4.21: Results of lane keeping tests with no controller action (dashed), and 
semi-autonomous controller intervention (dotted, solid, and dash-dot) 
The dashed black line in Figure 4.21 represents the vehicle trajectory under 
complete driver control (K = 0), and is shown here and in subsequent plots as a reference 
for the trajectory the driver would have followed had the semi-autonomous controller not 
engaged. For various intervention thresholds, the semi-autonomous controller 
successfully kept the driver within the safe corridor while allowing him significant 
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control authority while inside this corridor (x≈-20m to x≈70m). Only when the vehicle 
was about to depart from the corridor did the controller intervene to prevent departure. 
Note that at x≈10m and x≈50m, the threat assessment increased slightly due to the 
increased level of sideslip required to remain within the lane. This led to a corresponding 
increase in K for the configuration with Φeng = 0º. When the driver corrected the vehicle 
heading, K returned to approximately zero. By increasing Φeng as in ([1º 3º] and [2º 4º]), 
much of this low-threat intervention was eliminated. 
Good experimental results were obtained using both front wheel slip Фα and 
objective function cost ФJ as threat metrics. Figure 4.22 compares two such experiments, 
both of which use Фeng = 0º and Фaut = 3º, to tests with zero intervention (dashed) and 
autonomous control (solid). 
 
Figure 4.22: Results of multiple hazard avoidance tests comparing intervention 
based on Φα and ΦJ to autonomous control 
Figure 4.23 compares controller performance in a hazard avoidance scenario 
when Φα and ΦJ are used to regulate controller intervention.  
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Figure 4.23: Results of hazard avoidance tests with no controller action (dashed), 
autonomous control (solid), Φα-regulated intervention (dash-dot), and ΦJ-regulated 
intervention (dotted) 
Similar to the multiple hazard avoidance experiments, controller intervention in 
hazard avoidance experiments allowed the driver significant freedom to follow a desired 
trajectory while that trajectory remained both stable and safely within the navigable road 
corridor. When the controller intervened near the corridor boundary, it allocated enough 
control authority to the controller to avert departure or loss of control. Note that the 
trajectory oscillation observed in the Φα-regulated experiment was a result of an 
overcorrection on the part of the controller at x≈65m. The vehicle trajectory proceeded to 
rebound from yymax because the driver’s input remained at zero. Were the driver more 
attentive as a result of the first intervention incident, the low levels of K directly 
following the initial rebound would have allowed him significant control authority to 
correct and straighten out the vehicle.    
Figure 4.23 also shows the results of an autonomous experiment in which the 
controller was given full control authority (K=1). Notice that for the given driver input 
(δdriver = 0), the vehicle path under semi-autonomous control closely resembles the “best 
case” (i.e. autonomously-achieved) path while exerting an average intervention gain (K) 
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of only 0.40 and 0.28 for Φα- and ΦJ - regulated intervention, respectively. This is 
significant as it shows that for similar (small) driver inputs, the controller effectively 
follows a near-optimal trajectory while conceding significant control authority to the 
human driver. 
Finally, notice that the noise exhibited at x ≈ 70 m in Figure 4.23 is a result of the 
vehicle’s skirting closely along yymin. Because controller inputs are very small in this 
region, the driver felt little of this noise. However, and as noted above, such noise may be 
reduced by increasing Φeng as shown in Figure 4.24.  
 
Figure 4.24: Results of hazard avoidance tests showing the effect of setting Φeng > 0 
As Figure 4.21 shows, both semi-autonomous trajectories closely resemble the 
objective-function-optimal path taken by the autonomous controller. Notice that using 
threshold settings Φα = [1 3]º, the semi-autonomous controller delays intervention slightly 
compared to the experiment without a low-threat intervention deadband (Φα = [0 3]º). 
While both controllers experience a spike in the intervention level at x≈70m, the [1 3]º 
threshold settings delay the intervention spike until the MPC-calculated inputs have 
subsided.  This avoids the slight oversteer experienced in the [0 3]º test. Overall, 
however, both sets of intervention thresholds proved effective in semi-autonomous 
control. 
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II) Intervention Laws – K and Kaug 
Intervention laws considering driver input via (4.4) were also shown to effectively 
allocate control authority based on both the predicted maneuver threat and the current 
driver input. Figure 4.25 shows how augmenting intervention gains  and ( αΦK ) ( )JK Φ  
according to (4.4) affected the performance of the semi-autonomous controller. 
 
 
Figure 4.25: Multiple hazard avoidance maneuver showing the effect of augmenting 
Фα and ФJ to account for differences between driver and controller steer 
Note from Figure 4.25 that in this particular scenario, the effect of controller 
augmentation on controller intervention and vehicle performance appears more 
pronounced than the effect of using different threat assessments (Фα vs. ФJ). This is 
consistent with the observation that for less demanding maneuvers (i.e. those which can 
be accomplished without violating lane constraints), the objective function cost is almost 
exclusively a function of front wheel slip and performs similarly to the front-slip-
modulated configuration. When these configurations are augmented via (4.4), initial 
intervention increases, allowing a subsequently smoother trajectory which ultimately 
requires less controller intervention (average K) altogether. Generally, augmenting K in 
proportion to driver-controller input discrepancy resulted in smoother controller 
intervention that was more acceptable to the human driver. That is, controller intervention 
based on the augmented threat metric Φα,aug or ΦJ,aug was generally more gradual and less 
startling to the driver. 
III) Closed-Loop Drivers 
The results above (Figures 4.21—4.25) show scenarios in which the driver input 
remained at zero. Experiments were also conducted in which the driver swerved at the 
last minute to avoid hazards. Two such scenarios are shown in Figure 4.26. 
 
 
Figure 4.26: Multiple hazard avoidance maneuvers showing the controller’s 
moderating effect on the inputs of the human driver 
Notice that in both semi-autonomous cases, controller intervention slightly 
preceded a late driver reaction. The combined effect of both inputs was sufficient to 
avoid both road hazards. Once again, this intervention appears similar to the optimal 
trajectory followed by the autonomous controller. 
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 It should be noted that in each of the experimental results presented in this chapter 
and in all of the other simulated and experimental results conducted to date, the semi-
autonomous controller behaves as a stable closed-loop system. A rigorous stability proof, 
however, is a topic of current investigation and is therefore not presented here. 
IV) Driver Experience 
While all three human drivers were generally satisfied with the controller’s 
performance, their feedback on each of this study’s approximately 180 experiments 
provided some insight into desirable intervention configurations and how these may vary 
from driver to driver. A very preliminary assessment of how different threat metrics and 
intervention laws interacted with the human driver is presented here. This is not, 
however, intended as a general treatment of human factors involved in semi-autonomous 
vehicle control; such a treatment is the subject of future work. 
Following each experiment, the driver was asked how comfortable he felt with the 
(semi-autonomously-controlled) vehicle’s response to his inputs. This qualitative 
feedback was recorded and correlated with the data from each maneuver. Though this 
correlation did not turn up a single dominant performance metric, it did show that in 
general, test drivers generally felt more comfortable during maneuvers with relatively-
low average and peak controller intervention (K) and very low average and peak lateral 
acceleration (ÿ). When controller intervention remained low, the drivers felt a greater 
sense of control. At low levels of lateral acceleration, they tended to mention better ride 
comfort. 
Figure 4.27 averages the maximum and mean values of K and ÿ over all 
maneuvers and drivers in order to compare threat metrics Φα and ΦJ to the autonomous 
controller. As seen in various simulation and experimental results presented in this 
chapter, semi-autonomous control based on either of these threat metrics tends to result in 
similar K and ÿ values. The aggregate statistics shown in Figure 4.27 also suggest that the 
semi-autonomous controller achieves similar vehicle stability and ride comfort (both of 
which are closely tied to ÿ) to the optimal (i.e. autonomous) trajectory while taking on 
average less than 30% of the available control from the driver. This result confirms what 
was suggested by simulation results in Section 4.2.2: the proposed framework robustly 
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allows for significant changes in its intervention law while maintaining many of the 
performance advantages offered by an optimal autonomous controller. 
 
Figure 4.27: Performance metrics averaged across all experiments and drivers 
Figure 4.28 shows how threat metrics Φα and ΦJ and intervention laws K and Kaug 
affect performance metrics over the maneuver. Notice here that while these intervention 
laws and threat metrics are of similar magnitude, they do exhibit one definite trend; 
augmenting controller intervention according to the difference between driver and 
controller steer (Kaug) generally leads (in an averaged sense) to higher average K and 
subsequently lower peak lateral accelerations. This was also inferred from the scenario-
specific results shown in this chapter and justifies the utility of this augmented 
intervention law as a means of improving vehicle performance and ride comfort. 
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Figure 4.28: Effect of threat metrics and intervention laws on the average 
performance of all three drivers 
The trends explained above also roughly hold for each driver individually. That is, 
while each driver’s performance and consequent controller activity differed slightly, the 
relative merits of each controller configuration discussed above tended on average to 
affect all three drivers similarly (i.e. lower maximum lateral acceleration using the 
augmented controller, etc). Appendix C breaks down performance metrics as a function 
of threat metrics and intervention laws for each driver. 
4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter has described the integration of MPC-based path planning, threat 
assessment, and semi-autonomous control into a unified framework for hazard avoidance 
and stability control. This framework provides an elegant and effective means of semi-
autonomously avoiding road hazards while conceding significant control authority to a 
human driver. Simulation and experimental results have shown this controller’s 
performance to be robust to (driver-preference-based) changes in its intervention law and 
thresholds. They have also demonstrated its utility as a stability controller capable of 
satisfying position, input, and plant dynamic constraints in the presence of system-
inherent time delays. Additionally, this framework has been shown to successfully 
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circumnavigate both static and dynamic road hazards given multiple scenarios, various 
driver inputs, and diverse threat metrics and intervention laws. 
Finally, while human factors have not been studied in depth here, it is expected 
that with additional investigation, a best case, or average driver-preferred intervention 
law may be described and intervention settings tuned accordingly. 
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APPENDIX A: ADAMS PLANT PARAMETERS 
Figure A.1 shows the ADAMS Car® model used to represent the vehicle plant in 
simulation. This model represents a generic high-centered light truck with a double 
wishbone suspension, and rack and pinion steering. 
 
 
Figure A.1: ADAMS Car® plant model used in simulation 
Table A.1 describes the parameters of the ADAMS plant. 
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Table A.1: Plant model parameters for ADAMS vehicle model 
Parameter Value [units] 
Total mass 2450 [kg]
Body mass 2210 [kg] 
Unsprung mass 240 [kg] 
Wheel mass 60 [kg] 
Body roll inertia 1240 [kg·m2] 
Body gyroscopic inertia 0 [kg·m2] 
Wheel gyroscopic inertia 0.2 [kg·m2] 
Measurements  
Wheelbase 2.85 [m] 
Track width 1.62 [m] 
C.G. height 0.76 [m] 
C.G. longitudinal distance from front wheels 1.07 [m] 
Wheel diameter 0.79 [m] 
Tire full width 0.24 [m] 
Suspension and tire stiffness  
Suspension spring stiffness 40,000 [N/m] 
Suspension roll stiffness 3700 [N·m/deg] 
Suspension damping 5,300 [N·s/m] 
Tire vertical stiffness 250,000 N/m 
Tire cornering stiffness 1200 N/deg (Fz = 6000 N) 
Steering wheel ratio 35 deg/deg 
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APPENDIX B: THREAT ASSESSMENT COMPARISON 
In Chapter 2, threat assessment accuracy was defined as the degree to which 
predicted threat at a given location matches the true threat at that location when the 
vehicle is controlled autonomously by the MPC controller. The results presented in 
Chapter 2 were obtained using an objective function of the form 
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This objective function setup penalizes front wheel sideslip (rather than lateral 
acceleration), leaving some question as to whether such a weighting actually minimizes 
lateral vehicle acceleration or whether minimizing lateral acceleration requires that αv  
and Rαα in (B.1) be replaced by y&&v and Rÿÿ to form 
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The results discussed in Section 2.3.2 (see Figures 2.9—2.11) suggest that in the 
context of MPC-based corridor navigation, various vehicle states may be penalized in the 
objective function with relatively similar corridor tracking performance. Extending this 
result to threat assessment suggests that either lateral acceleration or front wheel sideslip 
may be penalized in the MPC objective function without significantly affecting the threat 
assessed by various metrics (Φα, ΦJ, or Φÿ) and/or threat calculations (∞-, 2-, or “0”-
norms defined in Table 3.1). The columns of Table B.1 compare the accuracy of Φÿ-
based threat assessments (their nearness to true values of lateral vehicle acceleration) 
when lateral acceleration “ay” is penalized in the objective function (“Jÿ”) to the same 
assessment when front wheel sideslip “α” is penalized (“Jα”). 
 Table B.1: Comparison of threat assessments for autonomous controllers penalizing 
lateral acceleration and front wheel slip 
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Table B.1 confirms the assumption that weighting either of the dynamically-
coupled states ay or α in the MPC objective function leads to similar vehicle trajectories 
and threat assessments. Notice, however, that while these trajectories and corresponding 
threat assessments are similar and lead to a consistent predicted/true threat ratio, this ratio 
is slightly different for each and in both cases is greater than unity. This discrepancy is 
caused by model mismatch between the controller (using Model B) and the plant (using 
Plant B). This model mismatch arises due to some uncertainty in true plant parameters 
such as mass, inertia, and tire cornering stiffness. As model parameters more closely 
approximate true plant parameters, this ratio of true-to-predicted threat in autonomous 
controller operation grows closer to unity. 
Comparing the columns of Table B.1 also shows that in this maneuver, penalizing 
front wheel sideslip in the objective function actually leads to lower lateral acceleration 
than penalizing lateral acceleration itself. This likely follows from the dependence of 
front wheel sideslip on yaw rate and steering input (as minimizing front slip minimizes a 
combination of yaw rate and steering input, both of which are dynamically related to 
lateral acceleration). The result of this analysis suggests that penalizing front wheel 
sideslip in the objective function leads to a similar threat assessment and slightly lower 
lateral vehicle acceleration in autonomous avoidance maneuvers. 
Table B.2 compares threat assessments based on lateral acceleration (Фÿ), front 
wheel sideslip (Фα), and objective function cost (ФJ) when the controller uses cost 
functions (B.1) and (B.2). Comparing each metric’s assessment to true values of lateral 
acceleration, front wheel sideslip, or objective function cost shows that using the 
objective function weighting (B.2) while assessing threat based on Фα∞ or ФJ∞ leads to 
generally lower (more stable) states and better (closer to unity) threat assessments than 
using (B.1) or Фÿ∞. This results support the choice of these threat metrics (Фα and ФJ), 
the ∞-norm, and the Jα objective function weighting used in this thesis’s simulations and 
experiments. 
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Table B.2: Comparison of objective function weighting variables and threat metrics 
Jÿ Jα 
Фÿ 
  
Фα 
  
ФJ 
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APPENDIX C: DRIVER-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE METRICS 
Figures C.1—C.3 show how different intervention laws affected individual test 
drivers. This data is presented to support the overall (averaged over all drivers) results 
presented 4.3.2 IV) and substantiates the observation that the four principal intervention 
laws studied in these experiments ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )JaugJaug KKKK ΦΦΦΦ  and , , , αα  similarly 
affect key performance metrics of multiple drivers. For example, nearly all of these semi-
autonomous controller setups successfully assisted the human driver to avoid hazards (in 
a combination of lane-keeping, hazard avoidance, and multiple hazard avoidance 
experiments) while using less than 50% of the available control authority. These driver-
specific results also corroborate the conclusion that augmenting controller intervention 
according to the difference between driver and controller steer (Kaug) generally leads to 
higher average K and subsequently lower peak lateral accelerations. 
  
Figure C.1: Driver 1 threat metric and intervention law interactions 
 
Figure C.2: Driver 2 threat metric and intervention law interactions 
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Figure C.3: Driver 3 threat metric and intervention law interactions 
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